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I. INTRODUCTION
A legal problem that persists over time and touches important societal
interests in the United States tends to generate pressure for a constitutional
solution. This is currently manifest in the law of punitive damages,' in
which the growing exposure of deep-pocket defendants to large punitive
damage awards2 has spawned a vigorous constitutional assault on the
punitive damages system? It was probably inevitable that this conflict would
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' Punitive damages ar- also under political attack on a wide scale. See Daniels &
Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter
Myth and Reality].
2 Probably the most widely cited empirical evidence on the size and frequency of
punitive damage awards is M. PETERSON, S. SARMA & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE
DAMAGEs: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS iii, v-ix (1987), based on a study of jury verdicts in
Cook County, Illinois, and San Francisco County, California, conducted by the Rand
Corporation Institute for Civil Justice. Research at the American Bar Foundation has also
produced evidence of increased size and frequency of punitive damage awards in selected
jurisdictions. See S. DANIELS & J. MARTIN, EMPIRICAL PATTERNS IN PUNITIVE DAMAGE
CASES: A DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENCE RATES AND AwARDs (American Bar Foundation
Working Paper Series No. 8705, 1988); Daniels & Martin, Jury Verdicts and the
'Crisis' in Civil Justice, 11 JUST. Sys. J. 321 (1986); Daniels, Punitive Damages: The
Real Story, A.B.A. J. Aug. 1986, at 60; Myth and Reality, supra note 1. Authors of the
ABF studies emphasize, however, that the increased frequency ofpunitive damage awards
(in relation to the total number ofjury trials) is modest, and that increased size of awards
(in constant dollars) is minimal when analysis utilizes medians rather than means or
extreme cases. Their time series data is limited to Dallas County, Texas, and Jackson
County, Missouri, 1970-88. For data on punitive damage awards in product liability
cases, see PRODUCT LIABILIrY: VERDICTs AND CASE RESOLUTION IN FivE STATES 23-29
(GAO/HRD-89-99 1989).
1 See, e.g., Boston, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: Application of
the Excessive Fines Clause, 5 COOLEY L. REV. 667 (1988); Ellis, Punitive Damages,
Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REv. 975 (1989); Geller & Levy, The
Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 73 A.B.A. J. Dec. 1, 1987, at 88; Hughes, The
Excessive Fines Clause-Its Role in the Constitutional Attack on "Bad Faith" Punitive
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find its way to the spongy battleground of due process, if not inevitable that
the issue should still be unresolved. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip4 the Supreme Court had ample opportunity to clarify due process
limits on punitive damages but apparently was not sure what the limits were.
Although seven justices agreed that an Alabama punitive damages award did
not violate due process, the majority opinion failed to address the major
doctrinal questions in a way that would provide helpful guidelines for the
future. As a result, the issue is certain to be revisited. The decision in Haslip
was not wrong, but it lacks a viable rationale. Anticipating the day of
revisitation, this paper offers doctrinal and policy reasons why due process
should not become the means of constitutionalizing the law of punitive damages.
Awards, 54 DEF. COUNS. J. 252 (1987); Ieffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of
Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139 (1986); Leitner, Punitive Damages: A
Constitutional Assessment, 38 FICC Q. 119 (1988); Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause
and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1987);
Olson & Boutros, Constitutional Restraints on the Doctrine of Punitive Damages, 17
PEPPERDINE L. REv. 907 (1990); Schwartz, Browning-Ferris: The Supreme Court's
Emerging Majorities, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1237 (1989); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case
for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983); Comment,
Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: An Analytical Frameworkfor Determining
Excessiveness, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1433 (1987); Comment, The Constitution and Punitive
Damages: Does Due Process Require the Definition of Degrees of Culpability?, 18 CAP.
U. L. REV. 545 (1989); Comment, Bankers Life: Justice O'Connor's Solution to the
Jury's Standardless Discretion to Award Punitive Damages, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
719 (1989); Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1699 (1987); Note, Can Punitive
Damages Standards Be Void for Vagueness?, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 52 (1988); Note,
Constitutional Defenses Against Punitive Damages: Down but Not Out, 65 IND. L.J. 141
(1989). But see Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law,
87 COLUM. L. REv. 1385 (1987); Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just
Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. REv. 195 (1977-78); Comment, Can Punitive Damages
withstand a Due Process Challenge after Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw and
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal?, 18 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 121
(1990); Note, In Defense of Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 303 (1980).
The latest constitutional challenges to punitive damages in the United States
Supreme Court include Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032
(1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 992 U.S. 257 (1989); Bankers
Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988). Doubts about punitive damages,
constitutional and otherwise, have been raised in the past, see, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53
N.H. 342, 382 (1873); Riewe v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 264-65, 9 N.W. 88, 89-91
(1881); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 276 (1935), but they
have now become more serious.
4 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
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II. COURT RESPONSE TO PREVIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES
Most state and lower federal courts, when presented with the
question, have refused to find punitive damage awards in violation of due
process or any other provision of the federal constitution The United States
Supreme Court, however, has been modestly receptive to pleas for
constitutional limitations in special contexts. As early as 1913, the Supreme
Court invoked due process to invalidate a statute-based penalty payable to
private litigants, on the ground that the award in question was arbitrary and
excessive.' More recently, after some vacillation, the Court imposed first
amendment limitations upon punitive damages in defamation cases. The
process of constitutionalizing the law of defamation began in 1964 with New
York imes Co. v. Sullivan,' which held that a plaintiff who is a "public
official" must prove the defendant acted with "actual malice" in order to
recover for defamation relating to his official conduct.' In Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts9 the Court extended the rule to include "public figures" as well
as officials but rejected a plea to find a first amendment prohibition of
punitive damages in a defamation action. Citing the 1851 decision of Day v.
I See generally J. GHIARDI AND J. KIRCHER, PUNITIvE DAMAGES: LAW AND
PRACrICE, §§ 3.01-09 (1985) (Supp. 1989). With respect to due process in particular,
the Haslip opinion observed: "So far as we have been able to determine, every state and
federal court that has considered the question has ruled that the common-law method for
assessing punitive damages does not in itself violate due process." Haslip at 1043.
Nevertheless, the current constitutional assault on punitive damages has found a
sympathetic echo in a few judicial opinions. See, e.g., Womack v. Gettelfinger, 808 F.2d
446, 451 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987); In re School Asbestos
Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1003-08 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d
1175, 1188 (8th Cir. 1982) (Heaney, I., dissenting); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp.
1053, 1064 (D.N.J. 1989).
6 Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914). See also
Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915); Missouri P. Ry. v.
Tucker, 230 U.S. 340 (1913). These precedents still stand, but they did not involve
common-law punitive damages and have had little impact on the practice of awarding
punitive damages at the discretion of the jury. Other cases of the same period reaffirmed
the existence of a due process limit but found the awards in question not to be so
"grossly excessive" or arbitrary as to fall within the constitutional prohibition. See infra
notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
7 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8 Id. at 279-81.
9 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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Woodworth,1" the Court observed that "the Constitution presents no general
bar to the assessment of punitive damages in a civil case."" Seven years
later, however, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 2 the Court discovered that
the first amendment required a showing of "actual malice" as a predicate for
recovery of either presumed or punitive damages in any defamation
action.13 The holding did not affect suits brought by public officials or
public figures because New York Times v. Sullivan had already established
"actual malice" as a requisite to imposing liability in such cases even for
proven damages. It did, however, place additional constitutional limitations
upon actions by private persons. 14
The limits placed on punitive damages in defamation actions reflect
first amendment values and have not led to Supreme Court curtailment of
punitive damages in other contexts. 5 On the contrary, the Court has since
rejected claims that suits for punitive damages, though civil in form, are
sufficiently penal in nature to require the same constitutional safeguards as
criminal prosecutions. In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc.,16 the Court ruled expressly that the excessive fines clause of the eighth
10 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
1 Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 159.
12 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
13 Justice Powell's opinion for the Court was heavy with implied criticism ofjuries:
"The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss
unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood
to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 349. Further,
"[J]uries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary
relation to the actual harm caused." Id. at 350.
14 Id. at 349. Since most states already required some form of "malice" to award
punitive damages, Gertz has had little impact on the law of punitive damages. It has,
however, eliminated the award of compensatory damages in cases where damage is
presumed, rather than proved, unless the plaintiff can prove malice.
15 In cases not involving constitutional rules, the Court has construed federal statutes
having implications for punitive damages and has sent out mixed signals there as well.
In International Brotherhood of Electric Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), the Court
refused to award punitive damages against a union for breach of its duty of fair
representation, citing statutory policy as the basis for its decision. Two years later, in
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), the Court declared
municipalities exempt from punitive damages in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), however, a majority of the Court held that §
1983, in a proper case, would sustain a claim for punitive damages (although not against
a municipality). The award affirmed in that case had been assessed according to common-
law rules.
16 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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amendment does not limit the award of punitive damages, at least when the
government is not a party to the action and does not share in the recovery. 7
In United States v. Halper,'8 decided the same term, the Court took a
similar position with respect to the double jeopardy clause, asserting flatly
that "[t]he protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by
litigation between private parties."1 Absent another change of mind, these
two cases suggest that punitive damage defendants will not find much help
in constitutional safeguards addressed specifically to criminal prosecutions,'
17M . at 260.
'8 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
1d. at 450. The statement was dictum but emphatic. The case held that the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment limited recovery by the federal government in a
civil action based on conduct for which the defendant had previously been punished
through the criminal process. The Court qualified its position by stating that nothing in
the opinion would preclude aprivate party from filing a civil action seeking damages for
conduct that previously had been the subject of criminal prosecution and punishment. The
Court left open the question whether a qui tam action, in which a private party sues in
the name of the United States and shares with the government any award recovered,
could implicate double jeopardy. Id. at 450 n.l1.
The Fifth Circuit had previously held that punitive damages awarded in a private
lawsuit to an individual plaintiff were not part of an "essentially criminal" proceeding and
thus were not within the purview of the double jeopardy clause. Hansen v. Johns-
Manville Prod. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Juzwin v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1989) (private action against asbestos
manufacturers held not sufficiently "criminal" in nature to invoke double jeopardy
clause); Brotherton v. Celotex Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 148, 157, 493 A.2d 1337, 1345
(1985) (citing Hansen).
20 These safeguards include the sixth amendment rights to a speedy trial,
confrontation of witnesses, and assistance of counsel; the eighth amendment guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishment, and the fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination. In dictum the Browning-Ferris decision indicated that no part of the eighth
amendment was applicable "to cases of punitive damages awards in private civil cases.
. . . We think it clear . . . that the Eighth Amendment places limits on the steps a
government may take against an individual, whether it be keeping him in prison,
imposing excessive monetary sanctions, or using cruel and unusual punishments." 492
U.S. at 275 (emphasis supplied). The Court specifically left open the question of applying
criminal guarantees in situations where the government is a party or shares in the
proceeds of the award. Id. at 2920 n.21. Conceivably the Court might find the excessive
fines clause applicable to punitive damages in the courts of Florida, Illinois, Iowa, or
Utah, where a portion of the award may accrue to the state.
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III. DUE PROCESS LIMITs: HASLIP PERPETUATES
UNCERTAINTY
Browning-Ferris left intact the prospect of constructing a
constitutional bulwark against punitive damages on the foundation of the due
process clause. In Browning-Ferris the Supreme Court refused to consider a
due process challenge to the award of punitive damages because that issue
was not raised in the courts below,21 but it indicated willingness to address
the issue in a proper case.' The opportunity was presented in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,' in which the defendant insurance
company offered a due process defense at every stage of the litigation. The
claim arose from the fraudulent acts of a local insurance agent who
misappropriated health insurance premiums, leaving employees of Roosevelt
City, Alabama, without coverage. Pacific Mutual was not the health insurer,
but it did employ the agent for the sale of life insurance. In this case, the
agent had sold a Pacific Mutual life insurance policy to the city in a package
with the health insurance, the latter issued by a company not party to the
suit. Although Pacific Mutual was not directly implicated in the fraud, the
jury found the company liable for compensatory and punitive damages on a
theory of respondeat superior.' Of the 1,040,000 dollars awarded to
2 Id. at 277. The Court similarly avoided the issue in a case decided during the
1987 term, Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
' Browning-Ferris at 277; id. at 281-82 (Brennan, I., concurring); id. at 283
(O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
2 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1990). Petitioner Pacific Mutual also invoked the equal
protection clause and the criminal guarantees of the fifth and sixth amendments as further
bases for review. See subject matter summary, 58 U.S.L.W. 3602 (1990). Neither point
was argued by petitioner nor addressed by the Court, probably because neither had much
potential as a viable argument. Having decided that the excessive fines clause of the
eighth amendment is inapplicable to punitive damages claims between private parties, and
in recent dictum ruled out the double jeopardy clause, the Supreme Court was unlikely
to find that other Bill of Rights protections for the criminally accused are nevertheless
available. As for the equal protection claim, there is no obvious fundamental interest to
raise the level of scrutiny above minimum rationality. Thus, for Pacific Mutual to
succeed, the Court would have to conclude that Alabama could not rationally fix statutory
civil penalties for some types of proscribed conduct without simultaneously fixing limits
in all situations where punitive damages or other civil penalties are allowed. The Court
obviously was not prepared to reach such a conclusion.
24 The Court concluded that subjecting the principal to punitive damages liability for
the acts of its agent did not violate substantive due process, even though the acts were
unauthorized, performed on behalf of another company and done without the principal's
knowledge. Said the Court: "We cannot say that this does not rationally advance the
[Vol. 52:859
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respondent Cleopatra Haslip, the punitive damage component was assumed
by the Court to be at least 840,000 dollars.' The Court held that neither the
size of the award nor the court procedures violated any mandate of due
process.'
Although the outcome commanded a large majority, Justice
Blackmun's opinion for the Court is notably lacking in helpful guidelines for
the resolution of future cases. It does little more than straddle the larger due
process issue. On the one hand, the Court rejected the position "that the
common-law method for assessing punitive damages is so inherently unfair
as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional."27 On the other hand,
the Court found it "just as inappropriate to say that, because punitive
damages have been recognized for so long, their imposition is never
unconstitutional. "I If punitive damages are not necessarily, but nevertheless
may be, unconstitutional, what is the guiding principle? The rule, if there is
one, is captured in the following lines:
We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright
line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally
unacceptable that would fit every case. We can say, however, that
general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the
court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into the
constitutional calculus. With these concerns in mind, we review the
constitutionality of the punitive damages awarded in this case.2
This in essence is a prescription for ad hoc, case by case review of court
procedures and the size of awards to determine the reasonableness of punitive
damages. As a common-law principle it undoubtedly makes sense; it is not
far from describing what reviewing courts presently do. But it is not very
State's interest in minimizing fraud." Haslip at 1041.
1 Counsel for Haslip had asked for $200,000 compensatory damages, and total
damages exceeded that amount by $840,000. See id. at 1037 n.2.
6 Except for the respondeat superior issue, Pacific Mutual's due process objections
related to the size of the award as distinguished from the finding of liability for punitive
damages. Pacific Mutual did not contend that the agent's fraud was insufficient to justify
a punitive award. Rather it contended that the company should not be held liable for the
agent's conduct and that the award failed due process because of its size and the
procedures by which the amount was determined.
27 Id. at 1043.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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useful as a rule of constitutional law, and certainly not one that the Supreme
Court with its finite review capacity has the resources to police.
Applying this rule, the Court examined the jury instruction? and
the post-trial review procedures in Haslip, concluding that they were
adequate.3 In justifying the outcome, Justice Blackmun placed great weight
on Alabama's appellate review procedures as a check on the discretion of the
jury and of the trial court.32 His emphasis on the role of review procedures
is probably well taken, but this does not clearly distinguish Alabama from
most other jurisdictions. Setting aside or modifying excessive punitive
damage verdicts is the prerogative and the common practice of judges
30 If these jury instructions were adequate it is hard to imagine any extant jury
instructions that would fail. For discussion of jury instructions in other jurisdictions see
infra, notes 133-45 and accompanying text. In this case the jury was told that the purpose
of punitive damages was "'not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury' but 'to punish
the defendant' and 'for the added purpose of protecting the public by [deterring] the
defendant and others from doing such wrong in the future;'" and that "the jury 'must
take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the
evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong.'" Haslip at 1044.
"' Id. at 1043-46. Under Alabama law the trial court is required to place in the
record its reasons for reducing, or not reducing, a jury verdict, taking account of such
factors as defendant's culpability and the need to discourage others from engaging in
similar conduct. Id. at 1045. The Alabama Supreme Court has also laid down criteria for
appellate courts to consider in reviewing punitive damage awards. See Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1061 (Ala. 1987). These were summarized
by the Haslip court as follows:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages
award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as
the harm that actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness,
any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct;
(c) the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the
desirability of removing that profit and of having the defendant also sustain
a loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant; (e) all the costs of
litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its
conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil
awards against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be taken in
mitigation.
Haslip at 1045.
32 Id. at 1044-46.
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throughout the United States.33 In the end this decision tells us that Alabama
procedures pass the "reasonableness" test, but provides little basis for
predicting how other procedures will fare.'
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion offers a rationale capable of
resolving the question definitively, but his position did not, and probably will
not in the future, command much support on the Court. He insisted that
punitive damages are valid simply because they "are a part of our living
tradition that dates back prior to 1868."" This conclusion, in turn, rested
on the somewhat broader proposition that "no procedure firmly rooted in the
practices of our people can be so 'fundamentally unfair' as to deny due
process of law."36 Tradition, apparently, should govern no matter how
unfair the practice might appear in the abstract.37 Justice Blackmun's
opinion for the Court patently did not espouse this viewpoint, and the other
two opinions in the case, Justice Kennedy's concurrence and Justice
O'Connor's dissent, expressly rejected it.38
In future litigation the Court's opinion will not be very helpful in
resolving the constitutional issues, and the Scalia concurrence is almost
certain to be unacceptable. The remaining two opinions in the case, however,
provide the framework for a sensible resolution of the question. Justice
11 Justice O'Connor in dissent commented, "Alabama's punitive damages scheme is
indistinguishable from the common-law schemes employed by many States." Id. at 1056
(O'Connor, I., dissenting).
"' Concurring, Justice Scalia commented: "This jury-like verdict provides no
guidance as to whether any other procedures are sufficiently 'reasonable,' and thus
perpetuates the uncertainty that our grant of certiorari in this case was intended to
resolve." Id. at 1046-47. The Court suggested that the punitive damage systems of
Vermont and Mississippi, at issue in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257 (1989), and Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71
(1988), respectively, might not have passed muster had the due process issue been
considered. Vermont used the standard of "'manifestly and grossly excessive,'" and
Mississippi required the award to be a product of "'passion, bias and prejudice on the
part of the jury so as to shock the conscience.'" See Haslip at 1045 n.10.
3 Haslip, at 1054 (Scalia, J., concurring).
I d. at 1053. This follows his opinion for the Court in Burnham v. Superior Court
of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (1990), in which he had previously argued that
traditional practice is conclusive of fundamental fairness, unless the practice violates a
provision of the Bill of Rights other than the due process clause.
17 Justice Scalia did not think the Alabama procedure was very fair, in any ordinary
sense of the word: "I can conceive of no test relating to 'fairness' in the abstract that
would approve this procedure, unless it is whether something even more unfair could be
imagined." Haslip at 1053 (Scalia, I., concurring).
38 Id. at 1054 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1056 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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O'Connor, in dissent, identifies the particular issues that need to be
addressed if the Court is to provide a compelling rationale for its action. Her
opinion has a modest defect-she comes down on the wrong side-but her
elaboration of the issues should nevertheless be extremely useful to a future
court. Justice Kennedy's brief concurrence, by contrast, ignores all but the
central issue of fundamental fairness, but he provides the correct bottom line:
the common-law system for awarding punitive damages is sufficiently fair
and rational to satisfy due process. This paper will examine the issues raised
by Justice O'Connor (and others sharing her views) and, in doing so, will
provide a rationale for Justice Kennedy's conclusion.
IV. THE CONTENT OF DUE PROCES
The argument for due process limits on punitive damages has a
certain plausibility because of the breadth and flexibility of the due process
concept. In this regard due process has some obvious advantages over
constitutional provisions that have been invoked. It has the flexibility that
comes with unusual vagueness, and historically it has served as a limit upon
the substance of governmental conduct as well as upon governmental
procedures. As a substantive limitation upon government, due process at the
turn of the century became a refuge for business interests seeking
constitutional shelter from economic regulation by Congress and state
legislatures. The due process clause was interpreted to deny legislatures the
power to abridge "liberty of contract" and "vested property rights" through
"unreasonable" regulation.39 Although resort to due process as a limit on
economic regulation ceased with the triumph of the New Deal revolution,
and subsequently fell into disrepute,' the due process clause continues to
11 See discussion in Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 198 (1936).
The leading case was Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which struck down a
New York statute limiting employment of bakery workers to ten hours a day and sixty
hours a week. The statute was said to infringe on liberty of contract as protected by the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. For further elaboration of substantive due
process as applied early in this century, see Warren, The New "Liberty" under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. Rnv. 431 (1926); Haines, Judicial Review of
Legislation in the United States and the Doctrine of Vested Rights and of Implied
Limitations on Legislatures, 3 TEX. L. Rav. 1 (1924); Phillips, Another Look at
Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 265.
o The last Supreme Court case to find an economic regulation in violation of
substantive due process was Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587,
617-18 (1936), invalidating a state minimum wage law for women. The Court refused
to apply the doctrine in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397-400 (1937)
(another minimum wage case) and has since expressly repudiated it. See, e.g., Ferguson
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have at least theoretical relevance as a prohibition of governmental conduct
that is arbitrary and unreasonable4' or that "shocks the conscience."42
Since 1965, moreover, substantive due process has enjoyed a renaissance
through a new doctrine of "privacy" that invokes due process protection for
individual interests in abortion, contraception, and other "fundamental rights"
affecting family relations and personal autonomy. Substantive due process
thus continues alive and well, although its application to punitive damages
appears to have much more in common with the old economic substantive
due process, now largely disavowed, than with the new substantive due
process of privacy and fundamental rights.
As a procedural concept, due process is a guarantee of fair
procedures when life, liberty, or property are threatened by governmental
action. Ordinarily, procedural due process is not relevant to the process by
which laws or other governmental rules are made, but rather limits the
application of governmental rules to individual cases. A legislative enactment
may, nevertheless, run afoul of procedural due process if it prescribes
judicial or administrative procedures that are constitutionally inadequate
or if it imposes penalties upon individuals without providing for an
appropriate prior hearing to determine if the penalty is applicable. In the
latter event the statute may violate procedural due process-not because of
a defect in the legislative process (to which the due process clause does not
apply) but because the statute makes no provision for proper procedures in
application to the individual case.4" The more typical application of
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
536-37 (1949).
"' See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
(1926).
41 E.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987); Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
4' E.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
44 See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); North Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
4' For example, in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), the
relevant congressional statute stripped citizenship from any American who left or
remained outside the country for the purpose of military draft evasion. The Court
concluded that the statute deprived the affected persons of liberty without due process of
law and, because the statute was penal rather than regulatory, deprived them of fifth and
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
procedural due process comes in scrutinizing judicial procedures to determine
if the proceedings have been fundamentally fair. What constitutes the
required "fundamental fairness," of course, varies from one context to
another.' Administrative proceedings also are subject to due process
requirements whenever individual interests in liberty or property are at stake,
as in the administrative revocation of a driver's license or the denial of
welfare benefits.47
V. DUE PROCESS LIMITs ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
THE CLAiMS
Punitive damage awards, potentially at least, are amenable to
challenge on both substantive and procedural due process grounds. The
argument for a substantive due process check on punitive damages is quite
straightforward and speaks primarily to the size of the award. That is, an
award may be so excessive in relation to a defendant's conduct and so
disproportionate to the damages actually incurred that imposing such a
penalty is wholly arbitrary and unreasonable. As noted above, Supreme
Court decisions from the early years of this century invalidated statutory
penalties akin to punitive damages because the authorizing statute, on its face
or as applied, was arbitrary and unreasonable.48 Dicta in cases interpreting
other statutes of the same period assert that due process may be offended by
damage awards that are "grossly excessive"" or "so severe and oppressive
as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense, and obviously
unreasonable."'
The principle of a substantive due process limit upon grossly
excessive civil damages, although not applied by the Supreme Court for
sixth amendment rights available to the criminally accused. Id. at 164-66.
4" See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Walters v. National Ass'n
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Murray's Lessee v. Hobokeri Land
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
1 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits).
48 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
4 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909). Waters-Pierce was a
civil anti-trust action initiated by the state, not a dispute between private parties.
' St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66 (1919) (citations
omitted). In each of these cases the civil litigant was seeking damages within a range of
possibilities specified by the legislature, and the Court found the damage awards not to
be excessive. See also Missouri P. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 522-23 (1885).
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decades, remains a viable precedent and has recently been endorsed by some
of its members. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Browning-Ferris, in
which Justice Marshall joined, indicated that the earlier cases were still
relevant. 1 Justice O'Connor's partial dissent in the same case (oined by
Justice Stevens), also presumed that due process might impose a substantive
limit on punitive damage awards.' The Court itself, in a portion of the
Browning-Ferris opinion to which all justices subscribed, acknowledged the
existence of "some authority in our opinions for the view that the Due
Process Clause places outer limits on the size of a civil damages award made
pursuant to a statutory scheme."" In Haslip the Court indicated that the size
of the award, in relation to the plaintiff's compensatory damages and out-of-
pocket expenses, might implicate due process but did not indicate whether the
concern was substantive or procedural.' Lower courts also have surmised
that substantive due process may place limits on punitive damages, without,
as yet, holding any jury award invalid on that ground.55
The procedural, as contrasted with the substantive, due process
argument is somewhat more complex. One line of reasoning speaks to the
punitive nature of the proceeding. The primary purpose of punitive damages
is retribution and deterrence-precisely the rationale underlying penal law.
51
Several of our decisions indicate that even where a statute sets a range of
possible civil damages that may be awarded to a private litigant, the Due
Process Clause forbids damages awards that are "grossly excessive" . . . or
"so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and
obviously unreasonable" . . . I should think that, if anything, our scrutiny
of awards made without the benefit of a legislature's deliberation and
guidance would be less indulgent than our consideration of those that fall
within statutory limits.
Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
3 d. at 276 (citing St. Louis, L M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63
(1919)).
' "While the monetary comparisons are wide and, indeed, may be close to the line,
the award here did not lack objective criteria. We conclude, after careful consideration,
that in this case it does not cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety."
Haslip at 1046. This brief comment appeared in the context of a procedural due process
analysis. The Court made explicit reference to substantive due process in deciding the
respondeat superior issue (discussed supra note 24).
11 See, e.g., Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 1989); In re
School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1004-05 (3d Cir. 1986); Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705
F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1989).
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If functionally the two types of proceedings are similar, then, as the
argument runs, due process ought to require the greater safeguards applicable
to criminal prosecutions. 6 The prospect of prevailing on such a claim is
weakened by the Court's refusal in Browning-Ferris to treat punitive damages
as a criminal issue for purposes of the eighth amendment. But even if
criminal safeguards are not required, there is still an argument that such a
proceeding ought to require more stringent procedural standards to satisfy
due process than does the ordinary civil case. Typically, procedures
recommended by those who take this position include a higher burden of
proof ("clear and convincing" evidence rather than mere "preponderance")
and bifurcation of trials so that the jury first renders a verdict on the
underlying claim for compensatory damages before hearing evidence on the
issue of punitive damages.57
A second strand of the procedural due process argument focuses on
the absence of meaningful standards to guide the jury in determining liability
for punitive damages and fixing the amount of the award.58 This, more than
any other due process argument, has captured the attention of the Supreme
Court. Prior to the Haslip decision, several members of the Court had noted
a possible constitutional flaw in the lack of jury guidelines for deciding how
much the hapless defendant must pay. Justice Brennan (with Justice
Marshall), commenting on the punitive damages instruction given by the trial
court in the Browning-Ferris case, characterized the issue as potentially very
serious:
Without statutory (or at least common-law) standards for the
determination of how large an award of punitive damages is
appropriate in a given case, juries are left largely to themselves in
making this important, and potentially devastating, decision.
56 See, e.g., Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 241, at 245 (1985); Jeffries, supra note 3, at 139; Note, The
Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, supra note 3; Comment, Criminal Safeguards and
the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 408 (1967).
1 See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 3, at 991-1003; Wheeler, supra note 3, at 272. For
a carefully considered set of proposals for reform of punitive damages law, see
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PuNrrIvE DAMAGES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1989). See
also Punitive Damages, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY,
APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 231 (A.L.I. Reporters' Study
1991).
58 A variant of this argument emphasizes the lack of notice to potential defendants,
stemming from the vagueness of the standards. This issue is discussed infra, notes
169-90 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, the jury in this case was sent to the jury room with nothing
more than the following terse instruction: "In determining the
amount of punitive damages, you may take account of the
character of the defendants, their financial standing, and the nature
of their acts."...Because "[t]he touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government," Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986),
quoting Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889), I for
one would look longer and harder at an award of punitive damages
based on such skeletal guidance than I would at one situated within
a range of penalties as to which responsible officials had
deliberated and then agreed.59
Justice O'Connor, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, had earlier
expressed a similar belief that the due process clause is violated by a law
giving "juries discretion to award any amount of punitive damages in any tort
case in which a defendant acts with a certain mental state."' In her
Browning-Ferris partial dissent, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed her concern
about "the vagueness and procedural due process problems presented by
juries given unbridled discretion to impose punitive damages." 6 Justice
Stevens joined in that opinion.
The same focus on jury discretion is found in Haslip, in which six
of the eight participating justices treated jury discretion as the central issue.
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, thought the Alabama punitive damages award
unconstitutional because the jury instructions "offered less guidance than is
required" by due process. 2 The five justices in the majority (Blackmun,
joined by Rehnquist, White, Marshall and Stevens) also focused on jury
discretion as the crucial variable" but concluded that due process was
satisfied because Alabama procedures kept the exercise of jury discretion
within reasonable limits. 4 Implicit in their analysis is the unavoidable
conclusion that other procedures might leave jury discretion so uncabined as
to violate due process. Indeed, by explicitly distinguishing the post-trial
"' Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
6I Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O'Connor,
J., concurring). Judging from his concurring opinion in Haslip, Justice Scalia must have
changed his mind on this point, or perhaps never agreed with Justice O'Connor on that
detail of her opinion.
61 492 U.S. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
62 Haslip at 1056 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 1036.
6 Id. at 1044-46.
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procedures for limiting jury discretion in Browning-Ferris and Bankers Life
& Casualty Co., the Court implied that Justice Brennan and Justice
O'Connor may have been correct in raising a due process question in those
cases.
65
Each of these claims will be examined in turn but, as a preface to
that analysis, the issue of constitutionality must be distinguished from issues
regarding the wisdom or desirability of altering the law governing the award
of punitive damages. The point is basic and is frequently made in a general
way by the Court when distinguishing the proper bounds of its own role vis-
a-vis legislatures. Separating the two in practice, however, is not a simple
thing. Litigants, attorneys, judges, and commentators are all influenced in
their attitudes toward the constitutional issue by their evaluations of the
effects of punitive damages in particular cases and upon the legal system
generally. Even analytically the two are not wholly distinct because
consideration of practical impacts has a role in constitutional analysis,
especially with a concept like due process which asks if conduct is
"arbitrary," "unreasonable," or "fundamentally unfair." Nevertheless, the
two are not the same. All that is desirable is not constitutionally required
unless one views the Constitution as somehow guaranteeing a remedy for all
perceived wrongs.'
From a policy standpoint, a reasonable argument can be made in
favor of limiting and bringing more predictability to the process. The
literature on the policy question is extensive,67 and most of it proposes
1 /d. at 1045 n. 10.
66 See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981), for a
refutation of this idea in the context of a critique of noninterpretivist approaches to
constitutional analysis.
' See, e.g., American College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 57; Ausness,
Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1 (1985-86); Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An
Annotated Argumentative Outline, 11 F. 57 (1975); Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't
Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1053 (1989); Ellis, Fairness
and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1982); Grass,
supra note 56; Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law,
87 COLUM. L. REv. 1385 (1987); Levine, Demonstrating and Preserving the Deterrent
Effect of Punitive Damages in Insurance Bad Faith Actions, 13 U.S.F. L. REv. 613
(1979); Mahoney & Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Punitive Damages Versus New
Products, 246 SCrENCE 1395 (1989); Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a
Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1980); Owen, Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 1257 (1976); Owen, Civil Punishment
and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 103 (1982); Owen, The Moral Foundations
of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 705 (1989); Peters, Punitive Damages in Oregon,
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changes in the existing system. A number of state legislatures have responded
to these concerns by enacting procedural modifications and statutory caps
upon the size of punitive damage awards.6" Courts in some jurisdictions also
have imposed more stringent procedural requirements through their power
to adjust and declare the common law.' At the national level, the United
States Congress for several years has been considering proposals to establish
a uniform national standard for product liability litigation. If adopted, such
legislation could provide a solution to one of the more vexing problems of
punitive damages-that of repetitive awards for the same course of
conduct.' All this legislative and judicial activity indicates that arguments
18 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 369 (1982); Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That has
Outlived Its Origin, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117 (1984); Comment, Criminal Safeguards and
the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 408 (1967); Note, In Defense of
Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 303 (1980).
68 According to the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic
Development, WHO SHOULD BE LIABLE? A GUIDE TO POLICY FOR DEALING WITH RISK,
103-05 & n.69 (May 1989), at least 28 states had statutorily modified their punitive
damages laws since 1985. As illustrative of these, Alabama adopted a clear and
convincing evidence standard for punitive damages liability and placed a $250,000 cap
on most punitive damages awards, ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-20, 6-11-21 (Supp. 1990);
Colorado adopted a reasonable doubt evidentiary standard and limited punitive damages
to the amount of compensatory damages, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-25-127(2), 13-21-102
(1987); Connecticut required the court rather than the jury to fix the amount of punitive
damages and limited the award to twice compensatory damages in products liability
actions, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West Supp. 1990); Florida adopted a clear
and convincing evidence standard for punitive damages greater than three times
compensatory damages, FLA. STAT. § 768.73(1)(a) (1)(b) (Supp. 1991); Georgia required
clear and convincing evidence and set a $250,000 cap on punitive damages, GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b), (g) (Supp. 1990); New Jersey bifurcated trials in products liability
cases, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58 C-Sb (West 1987); Oklahoma adopted a clear and
convincing evidence standard for punitive damages exceeding compensatory damages,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987); Texas limited punitive damages awards to
$200,000 or four times actual damages, TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007
(Vernon 1987).
69 See, e.g., Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 723 P.2d 675
(1986); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. 1986); Tuttle v.
Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294
N.W.2d 437 (1980).
70 See, e.g., H.R. 2700, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1990); S. 1400, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1990). For further discusson of the problem of punitive damages in the product
liability context, see GAO, PRODUCT LIABILITY: VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLUTION IN
FIvE STATES (Sept. 1989); GAO, PRODUCT LIABILrrY: EXTENT OF "LITIGATION
EXPLOSION" IN FEDERAL COURTS QUESTIONED (Jan. 1988); Owen, Problems in
Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI.
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against the present system of punitive damages have been persuasive, at least
in some quarters. However, it does not make a case that change is
constitutionally required and may indeed be better evidence that the issue of
punitive damages is a policy matter appropriately left to legislatures and,
perhaps, to courts exercising their common law powers. In any event, to the
extent possible, the issue of constitutionality must be addressed on its own
terms and not confused with the policy question. The following discussion
of due process as a limit on punitive damages will maintain that distinction.
VI. PuNrrIvE DAMAGE AWARDS AND SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS
If the Supreme Court were determined to find substantive
constitutional limits on the size of individual awards, the excessive fines
clause would have been a better vehicle than due process because it relates
directly to the central issue-the excessiveness of the penalty. With the
excessive fines clause ruled out for any proceeding to which the government
is not a party, however, due process is undoubtedly the best remaining
possibility. The concept is elastic enough to permit stretching to fit, and, as
a limitation upon the substance of governmental actions, it requires
suprisingly little stretching. The older cases dealing with statutory
penalties7' are relatively close on point, and the prohibition of excessive and
unreasonable damages is quite consistent with the residual concept of
substantive due process that survived the Roosevelt era-the idea of a check
on governmental conduct that is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
L. REV. 1 (1982); Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the
Problems of Fairness, Efficiency, and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (1983);
Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of the Use of Punitive
Damages in Modern Product Liability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. RaV. 919 (1989); Williams,
Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone? 98 F.R.D. 323 (1983). For judicial views
see, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984); In re
Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053
(D.N.J. 1989); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294
N.W.2d 437 (1980).
7, See supra note 3.
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Arguably, as the present Court has acknowledged, such a limitation already
exists.'
In practice, however, substantive due process has not provided any
significant check upon the the size of punitive damage awards. It is seldom
invoked for such a purpose and, when invoked, is almost uniformly
rejected. 3 This undoubtedly reflects the general disfavor in which economic
substantive due process has been held over the past half century. State law
governing punitive damages, whether common law or statute, may be seen
as a form of economic regulation. Thus, any attempt to create substantive
due process limits on the size of awards would look like a revival of the
discredited economic substantive due process doctrine. The case for revival
is not helped by the fact that the principal beneficiaries of such a revival
would be the same kinds of business and corporate interests that benefitted
from the old substantive due process. The current constitutional challenge to
punitive damage awards is not, generally speaking, being mounted on behalf
of drunken drivers or persons who viciously defame or batter their victims
out of personal spite, malice, or anger. The Supreme Court, heretofore, has
I See supra, notes 51-54 and accompanying text. The existence of due process limits
on the size of an award was assumed by the U.S. District Court for the district of New
Jersey in an opinion rejecting a defendant's motion for summary judgment on a punitive
damages claim. Speaking of views expressed by members of the Court in Browning-
Ferris and Bankers Life, the court commented: "[W]e think that they can only be taken
as evidence that an unreasonably generous award of punitive damages may be attacked
under the Due Process Clause, which is hardly news." Germanio v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 732 F. Supp. 1297, 1300 (D.N.J. 1990). The Court in Haslip, at 1046, also
saw due process implicated by the size of a punitive damages award but did not
specifically invoke substantive due process.
" See, e.g., Kumar v. Lewis, 561 So. 2d 1082 (Ala. 1990). Product liability actions
have in recent years provided a modest exception to this generalization. Substantive due
process has been frequently invoked as a limitation on multiple punitive damages awards
for a single course of conduct, and several courts have expressed sympathy for the
argument without, however, having occasion to apply it. See cases cited supra note 5.
One case, Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp.1053 (D.N.J. 1989), vacated
on other grounds, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989), in fact held that such multiple
exposure violated substantive due process. On reconsideration, however, the court
vacated its order dismissing the punitive damages claims because "equitable and practical
concerns" prevented it from "fashioning a fair and effective remedy." 718 F. Supp. at
1236. Other courts have rejected the substantive due process objection to such multiple
exposure. See, e.g., McCleary v. Armstrong World Indus., 913 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.
1990); Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1990); Cathey v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir. 1985); Guarino v. Armstrong
World Indus., No. 88-1087-CIV (S.D. Fla. 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Leonen v. Johns-Manville Co., 717 F. Supp. 272 (D.N.J. 1989).
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shown no disposition to resuscitate the doctrine of economic substantive due
process generally, and this undoubtedly is a deterrent to its revival in the
lower courts. If the Court should find substantive due process relevant to
punitive damages, of course, it will become a standard mode of attack upon
jury awards.
Another reason for disregarding substantive due process is more
fundamental. In its current formulation as a barrier to excessive and
unreasonable governmental action, it adds essentially nothing to existing state
law on the subject. Courts in all states that permit punitive damages already
have the power, under common-law rules, to reduce or set aside awards that
are grossly excessive, arbitrary and unreasonable.74 Evidence relevant to
show that a particular award is grossly excessive under the due process
clause can be used to attack the jury verdict under state law. If the very
deferential review now associated with economic substantive due process
were applied in the punitive damages area, it is hard to see how defendants
would gain much.75
The Court faces a dilemma in any attempt to define due process rules
for determining excessiveness. On the one hand, to make any difference in
existing practices, guidelines must be quite specific in their demands.
I According to J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 5, at § 18.01 (Supp. 1989),
all but four states (Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri and Oregon) allow reduction of a punitive
damages award by remittitur. All states permit the court, on motion for a new trial or
judgment n.o.v., to set aside or change a jury verdict. However:
The jury verdict will not be changed or set aside unless the court finds that:
(1) it exceeds the punitive damages claimed in the complaint; (2) it was based
on prejudice, passion or bias; (3) it was based upon a mistake of law or fact;
(4) it lacks evidentiary support; (5) it shocks the judicial conscience.
Id. at § 18.02 (Supp. 1989). Appellate courts may also overturn a grossly excessive
verdict, although the trial court's decision will be reversed only if abuse of discretion is
shown. Id. at § 18.03.
" See, e.g., Puppe v. A.C.S., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.D. 1990), in which
the court observed:
If there are no grounds for a punitive damages award, a court need not
reach for a constitutional ground to reverse it. Such an unjustified award can
and should be reversed by either the trial or appellate courts on the merits
... . If this Court is in this case presented by a punitive damage award
which appears excessive, it will be reduced; the constitutional argument that
excessive punitive damages awards violate due process need never be
reached.
Id. at 1362-63.
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Otherwise lower courts will not find due process limits visibly different from
the limits presently imposed under common-law rules. On the other hand, the
more specific and demanding the guidelines, the less convincing they appear
as mandates of the due process clause, as heretofore interpreted. The
substantive due process standard that questions only arbitrary and
unreasonable conduct has not been a demanding one; as guidelines become
more specific and demanding, they look less and less like the due process we
have known. The Court can of course revise the Constitution to fit its current
predilections-the power comes with the office-but this seems a peculiar
cause in which to make a major shift in due process doctrine with
implications extending well beyond the area of punitive damages.
Stricter scrutiny of punitive damages might be warranted under
current substantive due process doctrine if the affected interests could be
characterized as "fundamental," but they are not very analogous to the rights
of privacy currently given such protection.76 Advocates of a stiffer
constitutional standard for punitive damages often claim that heightened
protection is justified because the proceeding is in some respects "penal."'
Certainly one objective of punitive damages is to punish the offender, but the
similarity to a criminal prosecution stops there. The litigation is between
private individuals, the state is neither prosecutor nor complainant, and the
losing defendant ends up paying money to the private plaintiff," as in any
other civil case. No possibility of a prison term arises without a separate
criminal prosecution. No criminal record is created. Some commentators and
courts have claimed the supposed "stigma" associated with liability for
punitive damages is comparable in important respects to the stigma flowing
from a criminal conviction,79 thus providing another parallel. Claims of any
significant stigma are not very convincing, however, and even if they were,
the stigma would logically follow from the finding of culpability, not from
76 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 3; Grass supra note 56; Jeffries, supra note 3. See
also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1062 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("The punitive character of punitive damages means that there is more than
just money at stake. This factor militates in favor of strong procedural safeguards.")
71 In jurisdictions where some portion of a punitive damages award is paid to the
state, a different constitutional rationale might apply. As suggested in Browning-Ferris
Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 268 (1989), such an award might also
be limited by the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment.
79E.g., Grass, supra note 56, at 251-52; Massey, supra note 3, at 1238; Wheeler,
supra note 3, at 282-84. Justice O'Connor also accepts this argument as valid. See
Haslip at 1062 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the amount of the damages.' There simply is no fundamental interest here,
stemming from the rights of the accused or any other source, that could
justify heightened due process scrutiny.
In its essentials, the issue raised by "excessive" punitive damages
awards is simply one of money. Money is not inconsequential; behavior of
individuals and business firms is heavily influenced by it. But governmental
conduct affecting economic interests is not entitled to exacting scrutiny under
current constitutional norms. If the conduct is not arbitrary and unreasonable,
it should stand. If a punitive damages award is so excessive as to be arbitrary
and unreasonable, it can be voided or remitted under existing state law.
Substantive due process, properly applied, may confirm this result, but it
adds nothing to it."1
VII. PuNITIVE DAMAGES AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Procedural due process objections to the current law of punitive
damages require a more extended analysis. The case law dealing with
procedural due process raises two broad questions: Does the due process
clause apply to the situation at hand, and, if it does, what procedural
safeguards does it require? With punitive damages the first
question-applicability of due process-demands an affirmative answer. Due
process provides protection against deprivation of life, liberty, or propertyn
For further discussion of the "stigma" issue, see infra, notes 105-16 and
accompanying text.
" A substantive due process objection can be made to aspects of punitive damages
law other than the excessiveness of the award. In Haslip, for example, the defendant
insurance company contended that due process is violated by permitting punitive damages
to be granted under a respondeat superior theory. Assessing punitive damages against a
company for fraudulent acts of an agent committed without the company's knowledge or
authority and contrary to the company's interest seems harsh, but it is not irrational or
arbitrary to assume that a company may thereby be induced to exercise better control
over its agents. As a policy matter, perhaps the law should be otherwise, but it surely
survives minimum rationality scrutiny under the due process clause, and the Haslip Court
so held. Haslip at 1041. For a good exposition of the logic of finding "complicity" on
the part of the principal, see Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 866-67 (Iowa 1983).
1 Much recent litigation has asked whether the injured person has a sufficient
"liberty" or "property" interest at stake to invoke the protection of the clause. See, e.g.,
Kentucky Dep't. of Corrections v. Thompson, 491 U.S. 454, (1989); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480 (1980); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976).
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at the hands of a governmental actor.' An action for punitive damages
necessarily involves prospective deprivation of property and this by decision
of a court, which is an arm of the government.'
A. The Mathews v. Eldridge Test
Since the due process clause clearly applies, the critical question is
what due process requires. The answer could be quite straightforward if the
Constitution prescribed the same procedures for all situations, but it does not.
Notice to the accused (or the party concerned) and an opportunity for a
hearing (or some expression of views) are basic elements of due process in
any situation, but what constitutes adequate notice and hearing varies with the
circumstances. Criminal proceedings demand the most stringent safeguards.
Due process is less demanding in a civil action and still more flexible when
applied to administrative deprivations of liberty or property. Flexibility is the
central theme of the Court's oft-quoted formula, from Mathews v.
Eldridge,' which makes the "specific dictates of due process" dependent
upon "consideration of three distinct factors:"
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. 6
s Due process is a restriction upon state and federal governments and their
instrumentalities, not private persons. The Court is frequently asked to decide whether
an entity is sufficiently governmental in nature, or so closely involved with the
government, that due process should apply. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S.
179 (1988); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
4 Despite Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), which found state action in judicial
enforcement of a private restrictive covenant, mere resort to the courts has not been
treated, by itself, as sufficient to turn the subject matter of every lawsuit into state action.
See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964). However, no one doubts that the procedures of courts must satisfy due process,
whatever the subject of the action.
" 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
16 Id. at 335. The Mathews criteria received some academic criticism at the time but
nevertheless have survived as accepted law. See, e.g., Mashaw, The Supreme Court's
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
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The facts of the Mathews case, which gave rise to this formulation, involved
administrative termination of disability benefits without granting the claimant
a pretermination evidentiary hearing. Applying these three factors the Court
held that due process did not require such a hearing. The Mathews formula
has since been applied by the Court to test the validity of a wide variety of
administrative proceedings.' It is used less often to challenge the
procedures of courts, and has yet to be applied by the Supreme Court in a
judicial proceeding involving only private parties.88
Whether or not the specific formula in Mathews is appropriate to a
particular case, some of its underlying principles have relevance for due
process in any situation. In particular, the first Mathews factor-the nature
of the private interest affected-is of central importance in determining what
process is due. The principal justification for constitutional rules giving
greater procedural protection to criminal defendants than parties to a civil
suit lies in the differing private interests involved. In the ordinary civil action
the thing at issue is "mere loss of money."89 In a criminal case, by contrast,
the defendant may be threatened with loss of personal liberty, which the
Court has characterized as "an interest of transcending value. ' The nature
of the private interest affected may also dictate heightened protection even
though the proceeding is nominally civil. A civil action for involuntary
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976).
7 E.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (involuntary administration of
drugs to prisoner); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (termination of disability
benefits); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988) (F.D.I.C. hearing);
Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985) (reduction of food stamp benefits); Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (dismissal of school employee); Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (transfer of prisoner to administrative segregation).
88 In Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), the Court invoked Mathews v. Eldridge
in a paternity suit brought by the mother with the aid of a state-paid attorney. In holding
that due process required the state to pay for the indigent defendant's blood grouping test,
Chief Justice Burger emphasized "the State's prominent role in the litigation." Id. at 6.
Occasionally lower courts have invoked the Mathews criteria in private suits. See, e.g.,
Premier Communications Network, Inc. v. Fuentes, 880 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1989), in
which the court used the Mathews criteria to fend off a due process challenge to a district
court order in a suit between private parties. Justice O'Connor, in her Haslip dissent,
found the Mathews v. Eldridge factors explicitly and directly relevant, Haslip at 1061-62
(O'Connor, I., dissenting), although none of the other opinions mentioned them.
" This expression was used by the Court in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424
(1979), in giving reasons for variations in the required standard of proof.
I Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,525 (1958). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 363-64 (1970), which emphasized the important interests at stake in the possible
loss of liberty and the stigma imposed by conviction.
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commitment to a mental hospital, for example, has been held to require a
"clear and convincing" standard of proof, rather than the usual
"preponderance" of the evidence, because the private interest at stake is "a
significant deprivation of liberty."91 Every due process case does not
require a court to engage in fine tuning of procedural requirements to fit "the
private interest that will be affected by the official action," but the nature of
the interest is always an important consideration.
The second and third Mathews factors also reflect important general
concerns but often are not immediately relevant to due process challenges
that arise in a judicial proceeding. They suggest a cost-benefit or balancing
analysis more specifically focused on administrative decision-making, the
setting in which the test was enunciated. Consequently, these criteria have
been used primarily in cases where the claimant's interest, and the value of
additional or substitute procedures, must be weighed against the
government's interest in getting on with the business of governing. When
judicial proceedings are challenged on due process grounds, the Mathews
criteria do not fit as well because the government seldom has an interest that
ought to be weighed against any party's interest in procedural safeguards. If
the government is a party, it clearly would be unfair (the antithesis of due
process) to make the other party's procedural rights inversely proportional
to the strength of the government's interest. 2 Hence, the three-factor
formula is appplied only occasionally in a civil suit and almost never in a
criminal prosecution.
As a practical matter, the fiscal and administrative burden imposed
on courts is seldom a significant factor in determining what due process
requires in a judicial forum.' The court's function is not to distribute public
funds, hire and fire, dispense occupational licenses, or administer
government programs. The government's interest in the outcome of a
criminal proceeding, or any suit between private parties, is to do justice. This
contrasts with administrative decision-making when individual interests in
notice and hearing must be balanced against the requirements of
' Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.
91 When the government is a party, and the threatened deprivation to the private
party could affect an important liberty interest, special circumstances may dictate
consideration of the second Mathews factor-the risk of erroneous deprivation and the
value of additional or substitute procedures. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982), discussed infra text accompanying notes 117-19.
9' But see Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). There the Court treated the cost of
a blood grouping test in a paternity action as a fiscal/administrative burden on
government that was outweighed by its value in reducing the risk of error and by the
indigent putative father's interest in a correct determination of paternity.
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administrative efficiency. If fiscal and administrative burdens are not taken
into account in assessing what process can be demanded by individuals
adversely affected by administrative decisions, government programs could
conceivably be brought to a standstill by thousands of demands to be heard.
The Mathews criteria were propounded with that setting in mind, not a court
proceeding. With courts, a mandate to consider the fiscal and administrative
costs of "additional or substitute" procedures in each case would make little
sense unless a party is demanding some unusual service at government
expense, such as a blood grouping test.
B. Mathews v. Eldridge and Punitive Damages
The Haslip majority did not invoke the Mathews criteria in deciding
whether Alabama law satisfied the requirements of procedural due process
in the award of punitive damages. This is not surprising, since the Court has
consistently ignored the Mathews test when confronted with a due process
challenge to the sufficiency of judicial proceedings between private parties.
Justice O'Connor's dissent, by contrast, relied heavily upon the Mathews
factors to buttress her conclusion that Alabama procedures violated due
process. In so doing, however, she appeared to be relying less on relevant
precedent than upon Professor Malcolm Wheeler's widely cited discussion
of constitutional limitations upon the award of discretionary punitive
damages. 4 Although I disagree with the conclusions reached in Professor
Wheeler's article and Justice O'Connor's opinion, their thoughtful analyses
raise issues that deserve to be examined. In particular, their insistence upon
the relevance of Mathews v. Eldridge for punitive damage proceedings merits
thorough consideration.
One aspect of the problem can be explored by reference to their
proposals for bringing state law into compliance with the Mathews due
process standards. According to Professor Wheeler, due process cannot be
satisfied unless the following reforms are implemented:
(1) establishment of a statutorily-mandated maximum amount of
punitive damages; (2) where the statute does not fix the amount of
punitive damages, the bifurcation of trials in which punitive
damages are sought, with the first phase of the trial determining
liability and compensatory damages, and the second determining
only punitive damages; and (3) proof of each element of a punitive
" Wheeler, supra note 3; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032,
1061-65 (1991) (O'Connor, I., dissenting).
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damages claim by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a
mere preponderance of the evidence. 95
Justice O'Connor explicitly endorses each of these proposed reforms,'
although she is more inclined to treat them as recommendations than as
absolute requirements of due process.' In addition Justice O'Connor places
special emphasis on the need for instructions that provide better guidance to
juries in determining liability for punitive damages and fixing the size of the
award.98 The following discussion will not evaluate the desirability of any
of these measures on grounds of public policy. It will, however, challenge
the proposition that any of them is required by Mathews v. Eldridge, or any
other valid due process standard, in a punitive damages proceeding between
private parties.
The proposal for a statutory cap on punitive damages is perhaps the
easiest to dismiss as a dictate of the Mathews factors. It is primarily an
appeal to the substantive rather than the procedural aspects of due process,
and thus is not appropriately examined by reference to Mathews. A statutory
cap undoubtedly has procedural implications because it limits the jury's
discretion to set the size of an award. But thus limiting jury discretion serves
no useful purpose without an underlying assumption that punitive damages
beyond some fixed amount (or perhaps some multiple of compensatory
damages) are excessive, arbitrary and unreasonable in a constitutional sense.
Once this assumption is made, the real constitutional issue becomes the
excessiveness of the award, which is a matter of substantive, not procedural,
due process. Under substantive due process reasoning, a statutory maximum,
whether expressed as a fixed ceiling or a predetermined ratio to
compensatory damages, is hard to justify as a mandate of due process.
Substantive due process is a guarantee against government action that is
arbitrary and unreasonable, and an award of punitive damages can be deemed
unreasonable or excessively large only in relation to the circumstances of a
particular case. A given statutory cap or multiple (ratio) might, when applied
to a wealthy and determined defendant, fall far short of the amount
reasonably necessary either to punish or deter. A legislature, for policy
reasons, might reasonably decide to establish a fixed limit of 250,000 dollars,
500,000 dollars, or some other figure, or a flexible set of limits for different
" Wheeler, supra note 3, at 272.
96 Haslip at 1063-65 (O'Connor, L, dissenting).
I She would allow states "to experiment with different methods and to adjust these
methods over time." Haslip at 1067 (O'Connor, L, dissenting).
98 Id. at 1055-61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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types of actions, but it is difficult to comprehend how due process could
require it.
One could attempt to conceptualize the statutory maximum as an
exclusively procedural requirement, having no reference to the excessiveness
of any award. Viewed in this light due process is satisfied so long as the
jury's discretion is constrained within limits set by the legislature, regardless
of the limits the legislature chooses to set. Credulity is strained by postulating
that any court would interpret due process in such a fashion. 9 The effect
would be to outlaw common law punitive damages but leave legislators free
to set limits of their own choosing. Hypothetically, a legislature might satisfy
due process by fixing the cap at 10,000,000,000 dollars, since this would be
"a statutorily-mandated maximum amount of punitive damages." If such a
limit would satisfy due process, the requirement is patently meaningless. If
it would not, the issue once more becomes excessiveness, a question of
substantive, not procedural, due process.
Thus, a statutory cap on punitive damages cannot be conceived,
sensibly, in purely procedural terms. Without some attention to the
excessiveness of awards, due process would condone limits so broad that
they are no limits at all, as well as limits so low that they serve only to limit
the discretion of juries to make awards which themselves are not excessive.
The dilemma posed by the attempt to mandate statutory caps on punitive
damages by means of the due process clause is inescapable. As a procedural
restraint requiring juries to make awards within statutory maxima, it is
essentially meaningless unless the legislature is also restrained in setting the
ceiling. But to limit the legislature, the Court must appeal to substantive due
process which, with respect to punitive damages, must ask if the limit is
arbitrary, unreasonable, and grossly excessive. Since what is arbitrary,
unreasonable, and grossly excessive can only be determined in relation to the
facts of a particular case, almost any statutory maximum should be able to
survive-at least facially-a substantive due process attack. That leaves due
process to be applied case by case to determine the excessiveness of
individual awards, which, as argued above," adds very little to the
existing rules by which punitive damages awards are evaluated.
11 This may, however, be what Justice Brennan had in mind when he suggested that
due process might be satisfied by providing the jury with "a range of penalties as to
which responsible officials had deliberated and then agreed." Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1989) (Brennan, I., concurring). Query: If the
legislature deliberated and decided to set no limits, would that satisfy due process? If the
key factor is legislative deliberation, doesn't that make it a policy question rather than
a constitutional question?
100 Supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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The proposals for bifurcation of trials, proof of claims by clear and
convincing evidence, and more detailed jury instructions are purely
procedural in nature and do not raise the complications of substantive due
process analysis. The question remains whetheithey are merely reforms that
a legislature might choose to adopt in the exercise of its policy discretion or
whether they are mandated by due process. Professor Wheeler and Justice
O'Connor invoke the Mathews factors in support of their conclusion that due
process is being violated; I believe, to the contrary, that Mathews v.
Eldridge, to the extent that it is applicable, supports the opposite conclusion.
In assessing what due process requires, as viewed through the lens
of Mathews v. Eldridge, my analysis will consider only the first two factors:
1) The nature of the private interest affected and 2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation through the procedures used. The third factor, the government's
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens entailed by additional
procedural requirements, will not be elaborated because it has little relevance
to a punitive damages claim. Professor Wheeler devotes a substantial portion
of his analysis to this factor, 10' but it amounts mainly to an argument that
the present system of awarding punitive damages constitutes bad public
policy and could be improved by the procedural changes he suggests.
Whether or not his policy argument is valid, it is beside the point. The third
Mathews factor does not call for an assessment of the public policy
underlying the substantive rules courts are asked to apply but, rather, for an
identification of specific government interests that might be burdened by
requiring decisionmakers to adopt additional procedural safeguards. The
government, as representative of the public, undoubtedly has a policy interest
in every substantive rule of law that is the basis of any lawsuit, but a court's
evaluation of the importance of that interest in each case surely cannot be a
determinant of what process is due in a judicial proceeding. Otherwise, for
example, the very substantial public interest in bringing lawbreakers to
justice would militate against the extensive procedural protection that due
process requires in criminal prosecutions. This is not what due process (or
the third Mathews factor) is about.
Justice O'Connor gives much briefer treatment to the third factor but
in doing so wholly misconceives its substance and intent. The third factor,
as worded in Mathews, is "the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail."" ° As stated in the
O'Connor dissent, however, "The final Mathews factor asks whether the
10' Wheeler, supra note 3, at 303-22.
1' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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State has a legitimate interest in preserving standardless jury discretion that
is so compelling as to render even modest procedural reforms unduly
burdensome."" ° Quite apart from the liberties taken in transforming the
general rule into the statement of a particular application, Justice O'Connor's
restatement misses the point of the rule. The government interest to which
Mathews refers is not an interest in preserving a particular procedure. If so,
the third factor becomes redundant of the second, which already takes into
account the procedures used. Rather, the third factor refers to the
government's interest in the substantive function that might be impeded by
requiring the agency to alter its procedures, which in that case meant taking
into account the burden of holding an evidentiary hearing before deciding to
terminate anyone's disability benefits. In a judicial proceeding, the third
factor ordinarily is not relevant. '
Turning, then, to the first Mathews factor, the private interest
affected in a punitive damages action is primarily, and perhaps exclusively,
monetary. In the typical civil case, this kind of interest calls for no
heightened procedural safeguards. It is sometimes said, and Professor
Wheeler strongly contends, that punitive damage awards should be subject
to greater safeguards because they also affect the defendant's reputational
interest, with a resulting social stigma that is in some ways analogous to the
stigma of a criminal conviction." 5 This is not a persuasive argument.
1 3 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1064 (1991) (O'Connor,
I., dissenting).
104 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
105
To award punitive damages . . . the jury must find that the
defendant acted maliciously, in "wanton and reckless disregard for the rights
of others," with "flagrant indifference" to the rights of others, or in an
"outrageous" manner. The word "punitive," denoting punishment for
wrongdoing, is used to describe the award. Courts have stated that punitive
damages awards represent the community's condemnation of "reprehensible
conduct" and express "social condemnation and disapproval." Thus, a
punitive damages award, unlike a compensatory award, seems always ...
to jeopardize the defendant's good name, reputation, honor, and integrity
(citations omitted).
Wheeler, supra note 3, at 282. Justice O'Connor also makes the "stigma" argument.
Haslip, at 1062 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105
(1991), the Court explicitly recognized that the third Mathews factor does not apply
unmodified to a due process analysis of procedures for prejudgment attachment. In place
of the third factor, the Court (in a portion of the opinion joined by eight of nine justices)
substituted, "in contrast to Mathews, principal attention to the interest of the party
seeking the prejudgment remedy, with, nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary interest
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Punitive damages claims are not about stigma; they are about money. The
alleged stigma in such cases is mostly inferential, indeed semantic, rather
than empirical. Its existence is largely presumptive and is implied from the
standard the jury applies in awarding punitive damages, not from any
objectively ascertained reputational injury. A product manufacturer's
reputation no doubt suffers from public knowledge that its defective product
has created a hazard to health and safety, but this results from the initial
finding of liability for the injury."°  Any additional reputational injury
flowing from an award of punitive damages would be hard to demonstrate.
Certainly, the added increment of stigma, if any, is not comparable to "the
stigma normally accompanying criminal proceedings."' 7 It has none of the
collateral consequences which serve to perpetuate the stigma of a criminal
conviction. It cannot be used to impeach a person's testimony in a subsequent
trial. It carries no forfeiture of civil rights or other legal disabilities.
Prospective employers do not ask about it. Nor does it result in
imprisonment."0 8 In comparison with the monetary interests involved in the
very large awards that have occasioned the current attack on punitive
the government may have in providing the procedure or foregoing the added burden or
providing greater protections." Id. at 2112.
106 Cf 1 L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, PuNrrIvE DAMAGES 44 (2d ed. 1989), who
conclude that
little or no stigmatization attaches to a defendant merely because punitive
damages are assessed.... If there is any stigma, it is almost always left by
the very fact that the defendant was found to have acted in a manner which
calls into question the defendant's ability to deal fairly and forthrightly with
the public. But that is true for any other civil cause of action which is
resolved against a defendant ...
107 Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1042 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985). For similar views, see United States v. Hooker
Chem. & Plastics Corp., 748 F. Supp. 67, 71-72 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting Wittman
v. Gilson, 70 N.Y.2d 970, 520 N.E.2d 514, 525 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1988)) ("a civil verdict
directing payment of punitive damages does not carry the same heavy societal stigma
stamped by a criminal conviction"); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp.
1053, 1058 (D.N.J. 1989) ("little if any stigma would be attached to an award of punitive
damages"); Ah You Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1465 (D. Haw. 1989)
(a punitive damages claim does not carry "the stigma inherent in a determination of a
criminal violation" and is not "'criminal' or 'penal' in nature").
"' In fairness, Wheeler recognizes these and other differences between criminal
conviction and a punitive damages award, but he minimizes their implications for the
resulting stigma. Wheeler, supra note 3, at 282-84.
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damages, the stigma arising from punitive damages awards is
inconsequential.
In the past the Supreme Court has refused to hold plaintiffs in civil
actions based on claims of fraud, clearly stigmatic in nature, to a higher
standard of proof than the usual "preponderance." Chief Justice Burger, in
Addington v. Texas, '09 noted that some jurisdictions use the intermediate
standard "in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-
criminal wrongdoing by the defendant," 110 but his analysis made clear that
this standard was not constitutionally required. A unanimous Court
subsequently held that a "clear and convincing" standard of proof was not
mandated by the Constitution in a civil suit for money damages alleging
securities fraud."' Similarly, in Ramsey v. United Mine Workers"' the
Court rejected the defendant's plea for a "clear and convincing" standard of
proof in a civil antitrust suit for treble damages, based on violation of a
federal statute. At bottom, the attempt to invoke heightened due process
protection for punitive damages defendants, based on the stigma flowing
from a finding of liability, is supported neither by relevant precedent nor an
appreciation of the real stakes involved. Money is the issue, and the private
interest thus affected cannot be constitutionally distinguished from other civil
claims involving "mere money."
A defendant's interest in protection against a punitive damages
judgment is obviously different in kind from the private interests the Court
has previously shielded by a higher standard of proof. In Santosky v.
Kramer"' the Court required "clear and convincing" evidence of parental
unfitness because a fundamental interest in preserving parental rights was at
stake." 4 In Addington v. Texas" 5 it was loss of personal liberty in a civil
proceeding for commitment to a mental hospital. No interest of comparable
kind or magnitude is present in a punitive damages proceeding, in which the
109 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
110 Id. at 424.
" Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-88 (1983). See also
Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917
(1989), in which the court held the "preponderance" rule sufficient for a civil RICO
action alleging fraud and claiming treble damages.
112 401 U.S. 302 (1971).
1 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
14 Id. at 769. In Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987), the Court held that due
process did not require a clear and convincing evidence standard in an action to determine
paternity.
115 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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core issue, pure and simple, is money-important to almost everyone, but not
deemed so "fundamental" in a constitutional sense as to demand special safeguards 6
C. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second Mathews factor-the risk of an erroneous deprivation and
the probable value of alternative procedures-does not suggest any different
outcome. The defendant is already entitled to all the safeguards of an
adversary proceeding governed by the rules of civil procedure and aided by
the best defense counsel he can hire. The typical defendant in a high stakes
punitive damages case is not handicapped by inability to retain excellent
counsel. Santosky v. Kramer,17 which considered this factor at some length
in deciding to impose a higher standard of proof than the usual
preponderance, can again be readily distinguished. There, in addition to the
"fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child," 1 ' the Court found several circumstances in the
case that might, under the second Mathews factor, increase the risk of
erroneous deprivation of the private interest. These included participation by
the state in a semiprosecutorial capacity, disparity in the litigation resources
of the state and the parents, and the possibility of "judgments based on
cultural or class bias" when the parents subject to termination proceedings
are "poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups."" 9 Clearly, these
special circumstances are not present in a punitive damages action between
"' In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853 (1990),
the Court reiterated its position that the clear and convincing evidence rule is the
appropriate standard when the interests at stake are "particularly important" and "more
substantial than mere loss of money." 1 L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 106,
at 42, appear to believe that the amount of money in question can make a constitutional
difference for procedural due process. Citing the Santosky Court's comment that the first
Mathews factor considers the extent as well as the nature of the deprivation, Santosky at
758, they conclude: "Thus, the likelihood of invoking additional procedural protections
for the punitive damages process may be directly proportional to the size of the award
and financial effect on the defendant." It is unexplained, and perhaps inexplicable, how
additional procedural protections can be invoked after the award has been made. If the
award, once made, appears excessive, the issue then is substantive, not procedural, due
process.
117 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
Id. at 753.
n9Id. at 763. See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), a family law
case in which the dissent (Brennan, J.) cited the Mathews factors in support of his
argument that a California law governing paternity actions violated procedural due
process.
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private parties. The state does not participate in a semiprosecutorial capacity,
indeed is not a party at all; disparity in litigation resources, if any,
commonly favors the defendant; and the prospect of judgment against the
defendant on the basis of "cultural or class bias" would not seem to be the
norm. Jury verdicts are sometimes characterized as arising from bias or
prejudice against corporate defendants, but if the judge can detect any such
bias his duty is to set aside the verdict. If an erroneous deprivation occurs,
it is because the defendant has not been able to adduce facts convincing to
judge or jury, not from lack of opportunity to fairly present his case.
Undoubtedly the risk of erroneously depriving the defendant of
property can be limited by altering the procedures in his favor, but this
increases the risk that the plaintiff will be erroneously deprived of damages
she might otherwise recover. When each side has an adequate opportunity to
present its case, as is true in the usual civil adversary proceeding, tilting the
playing field toward one side or the other is more likely to increase rather
than decrease the risk of an erroneous outcome.1" A procedural tilt toward
either side, thus, can scarcely be justified on the ground that it will promote
a more correct outcome. If there is any justification, it must rest on the
conclusion that the interests on one side deserve greater protection; and this
conclusion returns the discussion to the first Mathews factor-the nature of
0 Here I use "erroneous outcome" rather than the "erroneous deprivation" language
found in the second Mathews factor. This is because the Mathews factors, taken in
context, contemplate a government party acting to deprive a private party of some
protectible interest in liberty or property. In a private civil suit the government is not a
party but a referee. The court's decision may ultimately deprive the defendant of
property, but the court is no more interested in shielding the defendant from erroneous
deprivation than in avoiding erroneous failure to give the plaintiff her due. When the
government in its power and majesty acts to the detriment of an individual, due process
appropriately asks that the risks of erroneous deprivationbe weighed against the probable
value of alternative procedural safeguards. When private parties contend, due process
demands only fairness to both sides, not special concern for the defendant. Use of the
expression "erroneous outcome" rather than "erroneous deprivation" avoids the the pro-
defendant bias that might otherwise flow from the Mathews formulation. It further
illustrates the problems inherent in using the Mathews factors to determine what due
process requires in a judicial proceeding between private parties.
In Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991), the Court expressly
acknowledged that the Mathews factors require modification when applied to a dispute
between private parties rather than to a government-initiated deprivation. Although
Connecticut was a nominal party, the essential controversy was between private parties
over a prejudgment attachment. Recognizing the difference, the Court modified the third
factor to give "principal attention to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment
remedy" (rather than "the Government's interest"). Id. at 2112. This formulation,
appropriately, puts the private parties on an equal plane.
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the interests affected. The defendant's interest (I have previously argued) is
not of the kind to which special procedural protection has been, or ought to
be, granted. The tilt, conceivably, might be supported by the claim that the
plaintiff's interest is even less compelling than the defendant's since the
award of punitive damages is theoretically a windfall over and above any
amounts found necessary for compensation. It is generally awarded not as a
matter of individual right but to vindicate the public interest."' On this
view of the matter, the weakness of the plaintiff's interest, rather than the
strength of the defendant's interest, might be a reason for tilting the
procedural balance. As Professor Wheeler summarizes the point, "If punitive
damages are imposed improperly, or in an excessive amount, the defendant
suffers far more than a plaintiff does if the jury incorrectly fails to impose
them." 11
This argument too is less than persuasive. Whether or not the point
is correct that the defendant suffers more from loss than the plaintiff from
absence of gain (or should we balance the pain of the defendant's loss against
the pleasure of the plaintiffs gain?), such weighing of monetary interests is
scarcely the stuff of constitutional distinctions. Moreover, it overlooks the
public interests the plaintiff represents which are the reason for allowing
punitive damages in the first place. Greater procedural protection for the
defendant can only mean that the plaintiff's personal interest in being
rewarded for his efforts as well as the public interest in punishment and
deterrence will be less well served. In a contest between private parties, in
which the state serves primarily as a referee, due process ought to aim at
avoiding an erroneous outcome, rather than having a one-sided focus on
erroneous deprivation of the defendant's property. Otherwise, due process
becomes an aid to the defendant rather than an aid to justice, increasing
rather than decreasing the probability of an erroneous decision."
VIII. JURY DISCRETION: THE CoRE ISSUE
Under Mathews v. Eldridge, or any other due process standard, the
issue of procedural fairness in the award of punitive damages is not fully
,2, "Absent a statute allowing the recovery of punitive damages, a plaintiff has no
right to recover such damages." 1 L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 106, at 249,
and cases cited therein. See also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983) (punitive
damages "are never awarded as of right").
12 Wheeler, supra note 3, at 292.
123 "The command of due process in the context of punitive damages requires...
a balance between the due process rights of both the plaintiff and the defendant."
Industrial Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Chandler, 547 So. 2d 812, 835 (Ala. 1988).
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resolved by noting that the defendant has full opportunity to present his case
and that his interest is not of a kind meriting heightened procedural
protection. Even though due process requires no greater solicitude for
defendants than for plaintiffs, there remains a question whether the discretion
of the jury in finding liability and determining the amount of the award is so
unbounded as to be standardless, and hence fundamentally unfair. Criticism
of the trial jury's broad discretion has been widespread and vehement. It has
found expression among members of the Supreme Court (most recently from
Justice O'Connor)," u  in some lower courts"2  and in academic
commentary. 12 Most courts, however, have denied the allegation that
juries within their jurisdictions exercise standardless discretion,127 which
suggests that the case against juries is far from airtight. However, the
argument persists. Although it did not prevail in Haslip, the Court did not
rule out a due process attack on jury discretion in future cases. The argument
needs to be examined.
Underlying much of the concern with fairness in the award of
punitive damages is doubt about the competence and the impartiality of
juries, however they may be instructed. Much of the doubt about jury
competence, especially juror capacity to deal with the facts and law of
complex cases, is empirically based." "As cases become more complex,"
124 See supra text accompanying notes 58-65.
"i E.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
"26 E.g., Ellis, supra note 3, at 988-91; Leitner, supra note 3, at 128; Mallor &
Roberts, supra note 67, at 646-47; Wheeler, supra note 3, at 285-88.
127 See, e.g., Germanio v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 732 F. Supp. 1297 (D.N.J.
1990); Industrial Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Chandler, 547 So. 2d 812 (Ala. 1988);
Roberts v. Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp., 274 Cal. Rptr. 139 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 16, 1990); Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 386 S.E.2d 120 (Ga.
1989).
128 A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS
UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); Davis, Bray & Holt, The Empirical Study of Decision
Processes in Juries: A Critical Review, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN
SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 326 (1. Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977);
Campbell, The Current Understanding of the Seventh Amendment: Jury Trials in Modern
Complex Litigation, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 63 (1988); Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury
Trial Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 601; Goodman, Greene & Loftus, What
Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases, 21 TRIAL, Nov. 1985, at 65; Steele & Thornburg,
Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C.L. REv. 77 (1988). But
see Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform:
Symbols, Rhetoric and Agenda-Building, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269 (1989),
which sees the current criticism of juries as part of a broader attack on the whole civil
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Ellis tells us, "the ability of juries to decide correctly- that is, on the basis
of relevant evidence and the law as propounded by the court- becomes more
problematic.""29 The cited studies show there is some truth in this
observation, but as a constitutional argument it proves too much. If jury
competence is a due process issue, using a jury in any complex case
threatens due process. This, of course, is constitutional nonsense in view of
the seventh amendment guarantee of a jury trial in civil disputes before
federal courts in which the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars."3°
justice system.
129 Ellis, supra note 3, at 999.
130 A few courts have tried to fashion a "complexity" exception to the Seventh
Amendment, in the name of due process, but mercifully the idea did not catch on. See
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980); ILC
Peripherals v. International Business Mach., 458 F. Supp. 423, 444-49 (N.D. Cal.
1978), afj'd on other grounds sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. International Business Mach.,
636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 71
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (E.D. Wash.
1976). But see In re Fin. See. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979); Kian v. Mirro
Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1980); and Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v.
International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 227-29 (N.D. Ill. 1977), all of which
rejected the concept of a "complexity" exception. Even in the courts that found a
complexity exception, a decision about punitive damages would never satisfy their criteria
for determining when a case is too complex for a jury to decide.
A concise statement of the arguments against a due process complexity exception
is found in SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1126-31 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). The complexity exception is discussed, but not endorsed, in Friedland, The
Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U.L. REv. 190,
200-04 (1990). For arguments favoring the exception, see Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex
Cases: English Practice at the Tine of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLum. L. REv. 43
(1980); Oakes, The Right to Strike the Jury Trial Demand in Complex Litigation, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 243 (1980). For a historical argument opposing the exception see Arnold,
A Historical Inquiry Into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U.
PA. L. REv. 829 (1980).
The U.S. Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue, although in
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970), it stated without explanation that
complexity is one of several criteria for determining whether a case falls within the realm
of equity, rather than the common law, and thus outside the protection of the seventh
amendment. In 1987, the Court reaffirmed the seventh amendment right to have liability
determined by jury trial but declared that the amendment did not include the right to jury
determination of damages. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987). Some state
courts have interpreted the right of jury trial in their state constitutions to include jury
determination of damages. See, e.g., Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Serv., 789 P.2d 541,
551; Perili v. Board of Educ. Monongalia County, 387 S.E.2d 315, 317 (W. Va. 1979).
For a thoughtful historical and doctrinal argument against allowing any exceptions to the
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With respect to jury partiality, that contingency is already anticipated
in the authority of trial courts to set aside verdicts resulting from bias and
prejudice,"' and of appellate courts to reverse or modify lower court
judgments. Jury bias, the antithesis of procedural fairness, undoubtedly is a
due process violation, although courts generally look to their own precedents
and procedure, rather than the due process clause, for authority to set aside
the verdict."' Overturning a biased verdict in a particular case, however,
is quite different from declaring a whole class of decisions so inherently
subject to bias that due process requires greater protection for the defendants'
interests than in other civil cases, and, indeed, other jury decisions in the
same case. This is a distinction heretofore unknown to due process. The
criminal defendant is granted more procedural safeguards than a party to a
civil suit, but this reflects the nature of the interests involved-not a
conclusion that juries are less competent in dealing with criminal cases or
more prone to bias and prejudice. Bias, surely, is to be deduced from the
facts and circumstances of a particular case. An estimate of what juries are
likely to do when faced with a punitive damages claim surely cannot be more
reliable than the trial judge's appraisal of what the jury actually has done,
after the judge has witnessed the whole proceeding. A mode of analysis that
gives greater weight to the former truly represents a triumph of the a priori
over the empirical, of speculation over fact.
A. The Finding of Liability
Since no attorney can, with a straight face, urge a court to declare
juries unconstitutional, the constitutional attack is directed at instructions
which leave the jury with standardless or "unbridled" discretion. The jury
function in awarding damages involves two separate findings-one with
respect to liability and the other the amount of the award. On the question
of liability, the jury is typically informed that punitive damages are
discretionary, not mandatory, but may be awarded if the defendant acted
"maliciously or in wanton, willful or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's
seventh amendment right of jury trial in punitive damages decisions, see Note, Judicial
Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury
Power, 91 COLUM. L. Rnv. 142 (1991).
13 The court may also set aside a verdict if it is based on a mistake of law or fact,
lacking in evidentiary support, or shocking to the judicial conscience. See cases cited in
2 J. GnIARDI & 1. KIRCHER, supra note 6, § 18.02 n.6. All but four states (Iowa,
Kentucky, Missouri, and Oregon) permit trial judge remittitur of excessive punitive
damages as well. Id. at 46 n.4.
12 E.g., Puppe v. A.C. and S., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1355, 1360 (D.N.D. 1990).
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rights."133 Some states allow juries to award punitive damages for
"negligence" but require a degree of negligence entailing indifference to
consequences and utter disregard of the rights of others.1" A number of
states specify that the conduct must be "outrageous."'" Such expressions
undoubtedly leave the jury wide discretion to award punitive damages, or
not; but given the thing the jury is asked to assess-the culpability of the
defendant's conduct, imprecision and subjectivity are scarcely avoidable.
Identifying degrees of fault or wrongfulness is a qualitative, not a quantitative
process, and qualitative judgments are necessarily subjective. This is true
everywhere in the legal process. Furthermore, it is hard to see how the
133 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 5, at § 11.10, quoting Wisconsin pattern
jury instructions. In Wisconsin, the jury is also told that it "may withhold or allow
punitive damages as it sees fit, even if the conduct is found to be malicious, wanton,
willful or reckless." Id. Pattern instructions of other states, as well as ABA Model
Instructions for punitive damages are found id. at §§ 11.02-.20. For additional examples
of pattern jury instructions, see 1 L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, supra note 106, at
204-39. For a state-by-state summary of conduct giving rise to punitive damages liability,
see R. SCHLOERB, R. BLATT, R. HAMMESFAHR & L. NUGENT, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A
GUIDE TO THE INsURABILrrY OF PuNrrIVE DAMAGEs IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
TERRITORIES 18-26 (1988).
134 For example, the Alabama court has endorsed the following guidelines for the
award of punitive damages:
To authorize "punitive," "exemplary," or "vindictive" damages, there
must be "... negligence," meaning such an entire want of care as to raise
the presumption that the person at fault is conscious of the probable
consequences of his carelessness and indifferent to the danger of injury to the
person or property of others. Punitive damages are allowable for a wrong
maliciously perpetrated, or where the wrongful act is done knowingly,
wantonly, and recklessly, under such circumstances as to indicate that the
wrongdoer knew that the act would probably injure persons or property, or
where the act was so grossly negligent, oppressive, or fraudulent as to
amount to malice.
Industrial Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Chandler, 547 So. 2d 812, 836 (Ala. 1988)
(quoting C. GAMBLE, ALABAMA LAW OF DAMAGE § 4-1 (2d ed. 1988)). See also, e.g.,
White Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 1984); Art Hill Ford,
Inc. v. Callender, 423 N.E.2d 601, 602 (Ind. 1981); Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co.,
291 N.C. 105, 112, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976); Inland Container Corp. v. March, 529
S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tenn. 1975).
135 See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979);
Gargano v. Heyman, 203 Conn. 616, 622, 525 A.2d 1343, 1347 (1987); Martin v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 508 Pa. 154, 171-72, 494 A.2d 1088, 1097 (1985);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 908(2) (1979). No state makes "outrageous"
conduct its sole criterion for awarding punitive damages.
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typical instructions in a punitive damages case can be held to violate due
process (by leaving the jury with "unbridled discretion") without also putting
in doubt the large bodies of tort law that equally rely upon such subjective
concepts as negligence, gross negligence, malice, or conduct that is reckless,
wanton, willful and malicious.136 If due process is to remake the law of
punitive damages by finding these widely used concepts constitutionally
infirm, it logically cannot stop until it has changed the whole face of tort
law, and perhaps the rest of the law as well. One would be hard pressed to
demonstrate that a jury's discretion is less "unbridled" in its search for
"reasonableness" or "good faith," which permeate the entire body of the
law, than in its efforts to find conduct sufficiently malicious, reckless, or
wanton to justify punitive damages. This is truly a thicket that even the most
courageous court should hesitate to enter.
B. Determining the Amount of the Award
Once liability is found, the jury must also determine the amount of
the award. The lack of adequate guidelines to cabin jury discretion in fixing
the size of punitive damages is perhaps the central due process issue.137
Instructions to juries on this subject typically state that the purpose of
punitive damages is to punish and deter,"' with the amount of the award
related to those purposes. For example, the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions
contain the following statement:
If you find that defendant was guilty of wilful and wanton
conduct which proximately caused injury to the plaintiff and if you
believe that justice and the public good require it, you may, in
addition to any damages to which you find plaintiff entitled, award
plaintiff an amount which will serve to punish the defendant and
to deter others from the commission of like offenses. 3 9
'6 See W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, HORNBOOK ON TORTS (5th ed. 1984), passim.
'3 It was clearly the issue to which the Court gave the most attention in Haslip. See
Haslip, at 1056-64.
1 Nearly all state pattern jury instructions sampled in 1 L. SCHLUETER & K.
REDDEN, supra note 106, at 217-39, make juries aware of these purposes.
"
9 Id. at 227. See also, e.g., Colorado pattern instructions (awarded "as punishment
to the defendant, and as an example to others"), id. at 225; Missouri pattern instructions
(a sum that "will serve to punish defendant and to deter him and others from like
conduct"), id. at 228; Virginia model instructions (awarded "to punish the defendant for
his actions and to serve as an example to prevent others from acting in a similar way"),
id. at 230.
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Another common variation is found in pattern instructions for the District of
Columbia which, in addition to identifying the functions of punitive damages,
expressly leave both the liability and the amount to "the sound judgment of
the jury" in light of "all the circumstances and evidence in the case, the
motives of the defendant and the intent with which he committed the acts
complained of." " Other courts give somewhat more specific criteria for
fixing the amount of the award. In New Jersey, for example, the relevant
factors as identified by statute include the profitability of the misconduct,
how long it lasted, when it was terminated, conduct indicating reckless
disregard of the likelihood of serious harm, conduct aimed at mitigating the
harm, and the defendant's financial condition.141 Most states make the
defendant's wealth a relevant factor, 42 but, conversely, the law of Alabama
expressly precludes consideration of the defendant's wealth in fixing the
amount of the award. 43 Some states also instruct the jury that punitive
damages should bear some reasonable relationship to compensatory
damages,' while in others the jury is told that they need not be
related.'45
These instructions admittedly leave wide discretion to the jury in
setting the amount of the award, but the conclusion does not necessarily
follow that due process has been violated. At the time the fifth amendment
was adopted, juries in America, "unlike juries today, usually possessed the
power to determine both law and fact."'" This very broad (might we say
11 Standardized Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, 1 L. SCHLUETER &
K. REDDEN, supra note 106, at 226.
141 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:58C-5(b),(d) (West 1989). These instructions were upheld
against a due process attack in Germanio v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 732 F. Supp.
1297 (D.N.J. 1990). For somewhat similar statutory lists of factors, see KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 411.186(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. § 5.549.20 (1990); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(b) (1989) (setting forth criteria for judges, rather than juries).
142 E.g., Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 733 P.2d 1073 (1987);
Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1980); Strauss v. Biggs, 525 A.2d 992
(Del. 1987); Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1977); Embrey v. Holly, 293
Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966 (1982).
"I Industrial Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Chandler, 547 So. 2d 812 (Ala. 1988).
144 See cases discussed in Annotation, Sufficiency of Showing of Actual Damages to
Support Award ofPunitive Damages-Modern Cases, 49 A.L.R.4th 11, §§ 13-14 (1986).
'"See id. at § 15.
146 Nelson, The Eighteenth Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REv. 893, 904 (1978). As late as 1793, Chief Justice John
Jay, trying a jury case to which a state was a party, instructed a jury that it had the
authority "to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy." Georgia v. Brailsford,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).
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"unbridled"?) discretion of juries was not considered to violate due process
at the time. Although the practice of permitting juries to determine the law
of the case has since been abandoned, the change occurred through common
law development and legislative enactment-not because due process was
thought to require it. 47
Historical analogies aside, determining the size of the award has
traditionally been left to the sound discretion of juries because the decision,
like the prior decision on culpability, is inherently subjective. How much
"punishment" is enough? What amount will provide just the right deterrent
to the defendant and an example to other potential offenders? The instructions
of a jurisdiction like New Jersey identify specific factors for the jury to
consider,' along with any other matters the jury believes relevant, but it
is not clear that such detailed instructions are any more limiting than the
simple admonition for the jury to determine what amount is adequate to
punish and deter. 49 Nor is it obvious that any feasible instruction, however
147 See L. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 150-53
(1973). The jury's right to decide the law was not conclusively denied in federal courts
until 1895 in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895). The Court noted that
juries in some states, by statute or constitutional provision, were permitted to decide
questions of law. While the Court strongly rejected the practice as ill-advised, it made
no suggestion that such state practices violated the federal constitution. Id.
148 See supra text accompanying note 141.
149 The New Jersey statute is too recent to have many reported cases under it. In
Minnesota, however, juries have made large punitive damage awards despite a state
statute setting forth equally explicit criteria for their guidance. MINN. STAT. § 5.549.20
(1990), reads as follows:
Subd. 3. Any award of punitive damages shall be measured by those factors
which justly bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, including the
seriousness of hazard to the public arising from the defendant's nisconduct,
the profitability of the misconduct to the defendant, the duration of the
misconduct and any concealment of it, the degree of the defendant's
awareness of the hazard and of its excessiveness, the attitude and conduct of
the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct, the number and level of
employees involved in causing or concealing the misconduct, the financial
condition of the defendant, and the total effect of other punishment likely to
be imposed upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including
compensatory and punitive damage awards to the plaintiff and other similarly
situated persons, and the severity of any criminal penalty to which the
defendant may be subject.
In Kociemba v. G. D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Minn. 1989), a Minnesota
jury applying these instructions to a claim of infertility awarded the plaintiff $7 million
in punitive damages, in addition to $750,000 for pain and disability and $1 million for
PUNITIVE DAMAGES/DUE PROCESS
detailed, would enable juries to get much closer to the mark (just the right
amount of punishment and deterrence, not too much, not too little), because
nobody really knows where the mark is. Economic models can postulate a
situation of optimum deterrence,"5 but they are singularly deficient in
dealing with the punishment objective. Moreover, values assigned to the
variables in the models are always hypothesized and, in a real life situation,
the true values remain anybody's guess. Historically, the right to make that
guess has been left to the jury, subject to the right (and obligation) of the
court to make a second guess if the jury's verdict appears excessive, contrary
to the evidence, or the result of bias and prejudice."'
Instructing the jury in the intricacies of the economic models is
unlikely to result in more rational or less biased verdicts. In all probability
the jury would not understand the model, and, even if it did, the jury would
still have to guess at the values to assign to the crucial variables, i.e., how
much deterrence/punishment is needed in this situation, and how many units
of deterrence/punishment will a dollar of punitive damages buy? These
crucial values the model cannot supply. Perhaps a team of economists and
other social scientists could define the mark more accurately and arrive at a
closer approximation of the penalty needed to reach it (or perhaps not, since
the crucial decisions may require value judgments rather than expertise). But
that is not the system we have. Due process should not require juries to
become, or pretend they are, economists and psychologists."
emotional distress. See also Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826
(Minn. 1988) ($12.5 million punitive damages); Kempa v. E. W. Coons Co., 370
N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 1985) ($7.9 million); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d
727 (Minn. 1980) ($1 million).
1 0 See, e.g., Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
79 (1982); Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much? 40 ALA.
L. REv. 1143 (1989).
I Standards for judging excessiveness are also generally lacking in specificity, again
because of the nature of the decision. According to 2 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra
note 5, at § 18.05:
Virtually all courts recognize that due to the special nature of punitive
damages no one fixed formula exists nor can one be devised by which to
measure the award's excessiveness with mathematical precision. Each case
must be judged by its own facts, and the courts use a combination of rough
judicial standards to guide them in this determination.
m David Friedman offers this enlightening comment at the close of his own
economic explanation of punitive damages:
[C]ourts are a very poor way of finding the correct answer to a
difficult question. If you wish to diagnose an illness, design a computer, or
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To suggest that a team of economists might reach a fairer result than
a jury may be deferring too much to special expertise. Economic models,
now much in vogue for the analysis of punitive damages,'53 are often quite
limited in perspective, creating the temptation to reduce everything to
economic terms. This often results in a focus upon the deterrent purpose of
punitive damages, which is readily amenable to economic analysis, to the
neglect of the punishment objective which is not. It also may lead to
peculiarly deficient value judgments, as illustrated by an assertion in a recent
economic critique, that punitive damages cannot be justified as a deterrent
unless one first determines "that the judicial imposition of a detriment
promotes rather than discourages the efficient use of resources."'" Such
discover a new scientific law, you do not do it by picking a dozen people at
random, forming them into a committee, and demanding that they give you
an answer. You do not even do it by picking out one general-purpose expert
and asking him.
Given the limitations of courts, it is sensible to to try to avoid, so
far as possible, asking them to do difficult things. I do not think that
including this Article in the instructions to a jury in a civil case would be
likely to result in a better, or even a more efficient decision. The law should
therefore, wherever practical, be stated in terms of simple rules, even if they
only imperfectly reproduce the outcomes of the much more complicated
correct rules.
Friedman, An Economic Explanation of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1125, 1138
(1989).
153 E.g., Calfee & Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. Rlv. 965 (1984); Cooter, Economic Analysis, supra note 150;
Cooter, Punitive Damages, supra note 150; Ellis, Due Process, supra note 3; Ellis,
Fairness and Efficiency, supra note 67; Friedman, An Economic Explanation of Punitive
Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1125 (1989); Grady, Punitive Damages and Subjective States
of Mind: A Positive Economic Theory, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1197 (1989); Johnston, Bayesian
Fact-Finding and Efficiency: Toward an Economic Theory ofLiability Under Uncertainty,
61 S. CAL. L. REv. 137 (1987); Levine, Demonstrating and Preserving the Deterrent
Effect of Punitive Damages in Insurance Bad Faith Actions, 13 U.S.F. L. REv. 613
(1979); Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 103 (1982);
Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective
Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1982); Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257 (1976); Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise
Liability, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 123 (1982).
15 Ellis, supra note 3, at 978. The statement appeared in the following context:
"Deterrence, being an instrumental objective, implies an effort to improve the state of
the world, which requires weighing the costs of imposing the threatened detriment. To
justify punitive damages as a deterrent requires the determination that the judicial
imposition of a detriment promotes rather than discourages the efficient use of
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a statement suggests that the analyst has become a prisoner of his framework.
Courts, lacking a better means of recompense, award damages for loss of life
and limb measured in monetary terms. But this cannot mean that the value
of preventing the injury in the first place can be measured solely in terms of
"the efficient use of resources." Life and health and avoidance of human
suffering have independent value. The economic costs and benefits of
deterrence may be important societal concerns, but they are not the sole
concerns. Legislatures might properly decide that the award of punitive
damages should be governed by an economic cost/benefit analysis. Courts,
however, ought not to do so without a legislative mandate, and certainly not
on the pretense that due process requires it.
Considerations of efficiency are not totally irrelevant to due process.
The Mathews factors direct a court to take account of fiscal and
administrative efficiency in calculating how much process a governmental
decision maker must provide to one adversely affected by the decision. That
is a far cry, however, from measuring due process by the demands of
economic efficiency. Quite the contrary, it is recognition that economic
efficiency in government may be at odds with the individual's interest in fair
treatment by government, to the extent that procedural safeguards hamper
governmental operations. Nor is the opposition between efficiency and
procedural fairness limited to administrative decision making. It is true of
judicial proceedings as well. Summary justice undoubtedly would be cheaper,
in an economic sense, than justice meted out under the stringent safeguards
of due process. Courts, however, by their nature give heavy emphasis to
fairness at the expense of efficiency because their substantive task is to
dispense justice. In a broader perspective, if economic efficiency were the
rule of decision, the entire American legal system would stand condemned.
No sane person claims the American system of justice is economically
efficient, or that it promotes efficiency within the American economy. Justice
it may provide, rights it may vindicate, but economic efficiency is not one
of its virtues. If the present legal system can be said to provide due process
of law, the promotion of "efficiency"-whether in the judicial process or in
the larger economy-cannot be the test of due process.
Even with the jury system we now have, ways undoubtedly could be
devised to give the jury more precise guidelines for fixing the size of the
award. With any given proposal, however, the difficulty lies in
demonstrating how due process requires it or even how it serves the accepted
purposes of punitive damages better than the rules now generally in use. The
most obvious approach, a legislative cap on punitive damages, may not be
resources."
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inconsistent with the due process clause but, as previously shown, can
scarcely be required by it. 55 The same is true of other more complex
proposals. A particularly thoughtful example is Professor Dobbs' suggestion
that punitive damages be measured by the defendant's profits from the
offending activity or, alternatively, by the plaintiff's costs of litigation.56
His proposal takes account of the practical limitations of juries and the
judicial system, and in many respects it is a rational, attractive alternative to
current approaches to punitive damages. It also provides a means of limiting
jury discretion in fixing the amount of punitive damage awards. It achieves
these objectives, however, only by remaking the substantive law of punitive
damages-which is clearly not a mandate of procedural due process.
As a predicate for liability he would eliminate the need to show
malice, recklessness, or any other indicator of a bad mental state, and replace
it with the court's estimate of whether additional damages are needed to deter
the defendant from repeating his harmful conduct in the future. 57 In
calculating the amount of the award, deterrence of the defendant is again the
only relevant factor.' The goals of punishment (giving the defendant his
just desert) and example (deterring others similarly situated) are abandoned
as irrelevant, perhaps illegitimate, and not amenable to any objective
measurement.' Focusing solely on the deterrence function permits resort
to quantifiable, hence objective, measures of deterrence-the profits resulting
from the harmful act"6 and the plaintiff's litigation costs.'
Unfortunately the objectivity provided by readily quantifiable
indicators does not mean that the measures are either reliable or valid.
Calculation of profits is always a slippery business, and in this context, as
Professor Dobbs recognizes, there is the additional difficulty of determining
what portion of defendant's profits (and costs) are attributable to defendant's
legitimate activities and which to the illegitimate. He also admits that a
profits measure would provide no practical limitation on the total liability for
punitive damages in cases of multiple injury arising from a single course of
's See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
156 Dobbs, Ending Punishment in Punitive' Damages: Deterrence-Measured
Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REv. 831 (1989). Some states presently instruct juries to consider
these factors, although not to rely on them exclusively. See supra note 141 and
accompanying text.
'57 Id. at 860-64.
158 Id. at 840 passim.
159 Id. at 854-56.
160 Id. at 868-88.
16 Id. at 888-909.
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conduct, such as product liabilty, if each plaintiff is allowed to recover all
of the defendant's profits.162 Beyond these difficulties of measurement,
profits would obviously have no relevance at all to an activity not motivated
by profit. Litigation costs, including attorney fees, are suggested as an
alternative measure of deterrence in recognition of these difficulties. As
Professor Dobbs points out, both measures are more objective than standards
presently placed before juries and, from the defendant's viewpoint, they have
the advantage of providing upper limits. Their validity remains a matter of
faith, however, since nowhere is it demonstrated that use of these measures
would achieve in each (or any) case the optimum level of deterrence."6
Professor Dobbs' proposal is thoughtful, reasonable, and lucidly
presented. It may deserve serious consideration by legislatures in the exercise
of their policy judgment. It cannot, however, be a mandate of procedural due
process. It requires substantive changes in the law, which is not the province
of procedure, and its procedures offer no basis for supposing that juries so
instructed will get closer to the demands of justice. Awards would become
more subject to predictable limits than at present, and defendants would for
that reason be better off, but nothing in the formula gives confidence that the
ends of punishment, deterrence and example will be better served. Indeed,
the proposal specifically disclaims punishment and example as valid objects
of the law. Whatever the merit of such proposed changes in the law, they
have little foundation in the procedural component of the due process clause.
One additional ground for assuming that broad jury discretion to fix
the size of punitive damage awards does not violate due process, by analogy,
may be found in the law governing the award of noneconomic compensatory
damages. The two types of awards have obvious differences. Punitive
damages are granted not by right but at the discretion of the jury to a
plaintiff already made whole by the award of compensatory damages.
Damages for pain and suffering are granted as of right, presumably in
compensation for injury actually suffered. With respect to setting the amount
of the award, however, there is essentially no distinction between them.
162 Id. at 885-87.
1613 A logical argument could be made that neither measure could possibly achieve that
result unless one also assumes that the offender would invariably be sued and would
invariably lose and that the assessment based on profits or litigation would provide the
right amount of deterrence. Otherwise the potential defendant might calculate he would
escape court challenge, or win, often enough to justify the gamble. Presumably the
defendant would engage in such calculation; otherwise the whole notion of deterrence is
undermined.
1991)
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL[o2
Noneconomic damage awards are often quite large, 1" and juries are given
no specific guidance in deciding how large because, once again, the judgment
is highly subjective." In the absence of statute, the jury is left to
' E.g., Winbourne v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 758 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1036 (1984) ($500,000); Wheat v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 699
(W.D. Tex. 1986) ($1.8 million); Cardillo v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 1331 (D.
Conn. 1984) ($3.5 million awarded by judge); Gonzales v. Union Carbide Corp., 580
F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ind. 1983) ($1.5 million); DiRosario v. Havens, 242 Cal. Rptr. 423
(Cal. App. 1987) ($2.1 million); Dolosovic v. New York, 541 N.Y.S.2d 685 (S. Ct.
1989) ($9.5 million); Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp., 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 495
N.E.2d 51 (1985) ($1 million).
65 "Because of the nature of noneconomic damages, there is no clear method for
measuring the loss and determining the amount of compensation due." Samsel v. Wheeler
Transp. Servs., 789 P.2d 541, 552 (Kan. 1990). Damages for pain and suffering have
been widely criticized, prompting more than half of state legislatures since 1975 to enact
statutory caps. See Pain and Suffering, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY, supra note 57, at 199. This study presents a balanced critique, with
recommendations that such damages be retained in the law but limited in significant
ways. Id. at 229-30. A recent statistical analysis of products liability actions has
concluded that pain and suffering awards "vary in a systematic and predictable fashion
so that the extreme critiques of pain and suffering awards are not supported by the
evidence." Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Products Liability Cases: Systematic
Compensation or Capricious Awards?, 8 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 203, 219 (1988).
[Vol. 52:859
1991] PUNITIVE DAMAGES/DUE PROCESS
determine how much is reasonable in the circumstances." 6 This represents
very broad jury discretion indeed.
Far from finding this broad discretion in violation of due process, a
number of state courts have held quite the opposite-that statutory caps on
noneconomic damages are themselves in violation of various state
constitutional provisions, including due process.167 Can due process now
require, in the interest of bridling jury discretion, what some states have
previously held that it prohibits? That, of course, is not the issue in the
current debate over punitive damages. But the extent and nature of jury
discretion in setting noneconomic compensatory damages is so similar to the
166 "The standard of evaluation by which an award for noneconomic damages is
measured is such amount as a reasonable person estimates to be fair compensation when
that amount appears to be in harmony with the evidence as arrived at without passion or
prejudice." Id. The Kansas court emphasized the subjective nature of the judgment:
The difficulty in determining the amount a reasonable person would award
an injured party for his or her noneconomic loss has been recognized by both
this court and the legislature. When instructing juries on how to assess
damages for pain and suffering, our trial courts acknowledge: "For such
items as pain, suffering, disability and mental anguish there is no unit value
and no mathematical formula the Court can give you. You should award such
sum as will fairly and adequately compensate him. The amount to be
awarded rests within your sound discretion."
Id. The court, in the same decision, upheld a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in
Kansas without, however, intimating that the common law rule leaving the amount to the
sound discretion of the jury denied due process or violated any other constitutional
provision. The Kansas rule is typical of the common law in other states. For example,
Michigan Standard Jury Instructions-Civil, § 30.01 (Supp. 1972) provides the following
instruction: "The amount of money to be awarded for certain... elements of damage,
such as pain and suffering, cannot be proved in a precise dollar amount. The law leaves
such amount to your sound judgment." See also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDiES 544 (1973):
Because pain and suffering damages are not compensatory, at least in the
ordinary sense, there is no clear method of measuring them; indeed, there is
almost no method at all. Courts have usually been content to say that pain
and suffering damdges should amount to "fair compensation" or a
"reasonable amount," without any more definite guide.
' E.g., Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (jury trial right,
"open courts" provision violated); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d
313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (void as "special law"); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125
(N.D. 1978) (equal protection, due process violated); Lucas v. United States, 757
S.W.2d 687 (rex. 1988) (due process violated); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash.
2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989) (jury trial right violated).
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jury's discretion in fixing the amount of punitive damages that the two cannot
be analytically distinguished. If leaving the amount of punitive damages to
the sound discretion of the jury offends the procedural guarantees of the fifth
amendment, logically the common law discretion of juries to fix the amount
of noneconomic damages is similarly defective. And, if this is so, the alleged
due process objection to punitive damages once again calls into serious
question other established rules of tort law. Fortunately the procedural due
process objection is not valid because the problem of jury discretion is not
procedural at all, but substantive. As long as the substantive law fails to
specify limits on the amounts recoverable for noneconomic loss or punitive
damages,168 relying on the jury's sound discretion is scarcely avoidable
(unless the jury role is eliminated). What is unavoidable surely cannot be
unconstitutional.
C. Notice, Vagueness and Due Process
One other due process objection to punitive damages, sometimes
raised in academic commentary (and vehemently endorsed by Justice
O'Connor), but never to my knowledge accepted by any court, is the void-
for-vagueness doctrine. 69 Under this doctrine it is claimed that standards
for determining liability and assessing the amount of punitive damages are
168 Several state courts have found state constitutional barriers to the enactment of
caps on compensatory damages, see supra note 68 and accompanying text. By contrast,
legislative modification or even abolition of punitive damages has not been generally
regarded as subject to constitutional restriction. Only one court thus far has declared a
state legislative cap on punitive damages unconstitutional, and that decision, was premised
on an obvious misapplication of precedent. See McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737
F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
169 Justice O'Connor's analysis is found in Haslip at 1057-65 (O'Connor, I.,
dissenting). For academic commentary, see, e.g., Leitner, Punitive Damages: A
Constitutional Assessment, FICC Q. 119, 126-32 (Winter 1988); Olson & Boutros, supra
note 3, at 926. Note, Justice O'Connor's Solution to the Jury's Standardless Discretion
to Award Punitive Damages, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719 (1989). Punitive damages
cases rejecting the vagueness challenge include, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594
P.2d 38 (Alaska 1975); Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 227 Cal. App. 3d
1111, 265 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1990); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 133 Cal. Rptr. 899
(Cal. App. 1976); Kirk v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965); Palmer v.
A. H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984); Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d
42 (Mo. App. 1988). For a good statement of standards for evaluating vagueness in a
criminal statute, see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). See also
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
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so vague as to deny defendants the proper notice that due process requires.
At first blush this argument carries a hint of plausibility, but it has a
fundamental weakness that its proponents have largely ignored: the void-for-
vagueness doctrine has been applied exclusively to statutes, and punitive
damages are traditionally a common law remedy.17 Many states have
codified the law of punitive damages in statutes,"' but it would be
anomalous to hold the codified rule more constitutionally vulnerable on
grounds of vagueness than the uncodified one. The void-for-vagueness
doctrine has also been applied primarily to criminal statutes, although
occasionally it has been invoked in a civil cause." The Supreme Court has
never asserted the void-for-vagueness doctrine to invalidate a rule of common
law, however, nor indeed used it as a rule of decision in any case not
involving a governmental party."
The argument, nevertheless, was given a degree of credibility by
Justice O'Connor's allusion to it in her Crenshaw concurrence, where she
stated:
The Court has recognized that "vague sentencing provisions may
pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient
clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute."
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). Nothing in
Mississippi law warned appellant that by committing a tort that
170 Indeed, how could it be otherwise when common law courts are authorized to
modify the law as they go along? Lack of notice is the gravamen of the void-for-
vagueness rule, but lack of advance notice cannot possibly be grounds for invalidating
a rule of common law. Given the nature of the common law, no one can know in
advance what common law rule a court will choose to apply in a given case. This is
necessarily true when the case is one of first impression in a jurisdiction, but almost
equally true in other cases where the court has discretion to apply one rule of law rather
than another, or simply exercise its common law powers to modify the law. Because this
lack of notice is inherent in the system, the common law cannot be held void for
vagueness without denying its essential nature. Justice O'Connor's Haslip dissent brushed
over this crucial distinction between statute law and common law with the observation,
"I have no trouble concluding that Alabama's common-law scheme for imposing punitive
damages is void for vagueness." Haslip, at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). When
examined closely, her arguments under the vagueness heading are probably best treated
as an extension of the "unbridled jury discretion" theme.
171 See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 68.
'72 E.g. Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (civil fine imposed
for violation of drug-paraphernalia licensing ordinance); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's
Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982) (denial of license for coin-operated amusement
establishment); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (deportation of alien).
173 At least I was unable to find such a case.
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caused $20,000 of actual damages, it could expect to incur a $1.6
million punitive damage award. 174
In Crenshaw Justice O'Connor objected primarily to Mississippi standards for
fixing the amount of the award and apparently did not find the jury
instructions on liability too vague. 75 In her Haslip dissent, however, she
declared Alabama jury instructions unconstitutionally vague as to both
liability and the amount of the award. 76 On close examination neither
conclusion appears supportable.
Quite apart from the inappropriateness of applying the void-for-
vagueness doctrine to common law rules, the contention that the Haslip jury
instructions on liability failed the vagueness test seems to be based on a
misconception of what the trial judge actually said. Pacific Mutual's liability
for punitive damages did not hinge on the typical jury instruction relating to
conduct that is "malicious" or in "wanton, willful disregard of the plaintiff's
rights."" 7 Rather, the jury was told by the trial judge that it might award
punitive damages if it found fraud.'78 No one suggests that "fraud" is too
vague a concept for juries to handle, and that was the basis for the jury
finding of liability. Strangely, Justice O'Connor said nothing about the fraud
instruction but directed her void-for-vagueness attack to a portion of the
instructions obviously intended to favor the defendant by assuring the jury
that punitive damages were not mandatory, even if fraud were found. In the
passage she quoted the court said, "Imposition of punitive damages is entirely
discretionary with the jury, that means you don't have to award it unless this
174 Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part). On the other hand, given the wide discretion accorded to juries
under Mississippi law, perhaps every potential defendant is on notice that a very large
punitive damage award is at least possible.
175 She said:
Under Mississippi law, the jury may award punitive damages for any
common law tort committed with a certain mental state, that is, "for a willful
and intentional wrong, or for such gross negligence and reckless negligence
as is equivalent to such a wrong." Although this standard may describe the
required mental state with sufficient precision, the amount of the penalty that
may ensue is left completely indeterminate.
Id. (citation omitted).
176 Haslip, at 1057-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" See supra notes 133-36 for reasons why such instructions satisfy procedural due
process.
178 Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537, 540 (Ala. 1989).
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jury feels that you should do so."179 Given this misperception of the jury
instructions, the ensuing analysis was necessarily wide of the mark.
The void-for-vagueness argument is equally unsupportable as applied
to fixing the amount of the punitive damages award. In Crenshaw Justice
O'Connor's objection to the jury instructions rested heavily on the implicit
analogy between punitive damages and criminal sentencing provisions.
Although the force of this objection was undoubtedly weakened by the
Court's subsequent holding in Browning-Ferris that the two cases were
insufficiently analogous for the eighth amendment excessive fines clause to
apply to punitive damages,"g she nevertheless returned to the same theme
in Haslip.'8 Much of her analysis there confuses the void-for-vagueness
question with the related, but different, issue of jury discretion. Since jury
discretion has been dealt with above," the discussion here will be confined
to vagueness as a matter of notice.
Even had the Court not rejected the criminal penalty analogy in
Browning-Ferris, the notion that vagueness in sentencing provisions violates
due process surely is subject to serious question. The quotation from Justice
Marshall's Batchelder opinion is at most a speculative observation and, in
any event, pure dictum because sentencing provisions were not at issue in
that case." 3 Moreover, it is dictum without support of precedent: the
Supreme Court has yet to find the criminal penalty provisions of any statute
too vague to satisfy due process. Justice Marshall cited three cases to bolster
his assertion, but the cases he cited did not support what he said. Two of the
cases dealt with statutory interpretation, not constitutional violations. In the
first case, United States v. Evans,"u the defendant was exonerated because
the relevant statute, the Immigration Act of 1917, was unclear as to what
penalty, if any, was to be imposed for the offense of concealing or harboring
illegal aliens. The Court refused to fill the lacuna in the statute, concluding
it was better for Congress to revise the Act "than for us to guess at the
revision it would make."' 85 In the second case, United States v.
Brown, 86 the Court upheld the addition of an escape penalty to defendant's
17' Haslip, at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by O'Connor).
"o Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 490 U.S. 454 (1989).
181 Haslip, at 1058-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
18 See supra notes 124-68 and accompanying text.
183 Nor has any Supreme Court opinion cited Batchelder on that point, save Justice
O'Connor's Crenshaw concurrence and her Haslip dissent.
184 333 U.S. 483 (1948).
115 Id. at 495.
186 333 U.S. 18 (1948).
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consecutive sentences as a matter of statutory interpretation and decided
nothing about the Constitution. The third case, Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,"7
raised a constitutional issue but was no more on point than the other two
cited decisions. Although a state statute was voided on due process vagueness
grounds, the defect was lack of fixed standards for determining what conduct
was prohibited, not the failure to specify a penalty.188 If the Court should
ever decide that due process requires precision in the specification of
penalties, it ought to find a better rationale than the authority of Batchelder.
Judicial prudence also would suggest that it ought to start with a criminal
statute, not the common law mle of punitive damages as applied in a suit
between private parties.
A convincing rationale for such a requirement may be hard to come
by, even as applied to criminal statutes. Logically, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine (in the sense of providing advance notice to the prospective
wrongdoer) ought not to extend to the specification of penalties. A person
needs to know what conduct will create criminal liability so as to avoid that
conduct. He does not need to know what the precise penalty will be, for any
reason related to due process notice, unless the law also assumes that a
person willing to accept the penalty is entitled to commit the criminal act. In
that event, advance notice of the penalty would permit people to make the
appropriate cost-benefit calculation. But no one has a right to violate the law,
even if it is in his interest to do so. Advance knowledge of the penalty may
serve a deterrent purpose, and the state may wish to specify punishment with
particularity for that reason, as well as to provide some consistency in
sentencing. But fairness does not require advance notice of the severity of
punishment to assist people in deciding whether or not to comply with the
law.189 A fortiori, if fairness does not require precise advance specification
1- 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
188 Id. at 403.
189 Existing statutes often provide enough leeway in sentencing to leave great
uncertainty as to the actual punishment that may be imposed. In Utah, for example, the
punishment for a first degree felony is "a term of not less than five years, unless
otherwise specifically provided by law, and. .. may be for life. ... " UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-3-203(1) (1990). Further, the judge is authorized under § 77-18-1(1)(a) to
suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation. Hence, the effective range of
punishment, as specified in the statute, is zero to life. Would this fail the vagueness test
because the accused cannot know in advance whether he will get probation, a life term,
or something in between? If not, why should the absence of precise limits on punitive
damages violate due process when only money, not personal liberty, is at stake? Or does
due process have a bias against juries, not judges? But doesn't the judge have the last
word on the size of punitive damages too?
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of penalties in a criminal proceeding, it surely cannot be a mandate of due
process in a civil action for punitive damages. 1"
IX. CONCLUSION
The risk of liability for unpredictably large punitive damages
undoubtedly is a problem for defendants in product liability cases, insurance
companies faced with claims of bad faith, and numerous other actual and
potential tort defendants. It may also be a problem of social significance, but
evidence on that point is limited and ambiguous. Available empirical data,
far from complete, indicate that punitive damages are awarded in only a
small fraction of cases and that very large awards are frequently reduced by
trial or appellate courts." ' Authors of the empirical studies do not sound
an alarmist note. On the other hand, those who are alarmed can point to
recent punitive damages awards in seven and even eight figures that survived
judicial scrutiny," along with the notorious $1 billion punitive damages
award in Pennzoil's antitrust action against Texaco.'" The increased
frequency and size of punitive damages awards in recent years suggests that
the problem may be growing, although the change is small if considered in
relation to the total number of lawsuits filed.'1
,1 The Ninth Circuit made this point forthrightly in Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 569
F.2d 459, 480 (9th Cir. 1977), applying relevant statute and case law of California:
[A]ny uncertainty as to the amount of permissible punitive damages in any
specific case does not invalidate the statute. Fair warning concerning the
specific conduct which is prohibited has been provided by relevant case law.
The fact that the amount of a proper damage award may not be precisely
known before trial does not make that award unconstitutional.
'9' See Myth and Reality, supra note 1; M. PETERSON, S. SARMA, & M. S-ANLEY,
supra note 2; Product Liability: Verdicts and Case Resolution in Five States, supra note
2.
11 E.g., Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711
(8th Cir. 1986) ($25 million), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987); Downey Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 234 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1987) ($5
million); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 241 Kan. 441, 738 P.2d 1210 (1987) ($7.5
million).
11 Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) ($3 billion
jury verdict reduced to $1 billion), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
194 No comprehensive study of punitive damage awards in the United States has ever
been undertaken. Existing empirical studies are limited both as to time span and locality.
See works cited supra note 2. Thus impressions of trends in the United States as a whole
are heavily dependent on press and other anecdotal evidence. In this communications
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Even assuming that the present system of punitive damages has
serious negative consequences for society, a remedy is more appropriately
sought by legislative rather than by judicial means. Legislatures can consider
all facets of the problem; the judicial perspective looks primarily to what is
lawful. Because the primary values at stake are economic and social, not
constitutional, legislatures are better equipped than the courts to weigh these
values and consider appropriate remedies. Many legislatures have already
done so, as witnessed by the recent outpouring of state laws regulating the
award of punitive damages.195
In principle, at least, courts recognize that their role is to declare the
law, leaving matters of governmental policy to the legislative judgment.
When the United States Supreme Court addresses state law its primary
concern is the constitutionality, not the wisdom, of the law.1"
Unfortunately, the distinction is often difficult to draw in practice. With the
network, a jury award of punitive damages obviously commands more attention than
denial of a claim, and a few large awards are far more noteworthy than a multitude of
small ones. On the theory that some empirical data for the United States as a whole is
better than none, I produced a "quick and dirty" estimate of the increasing incidence of
punitive damages claims in federal courts. This was done by searching the United States
District Court file in Lexis using the terms "court" and "punitive damages," respectively,
then figuring the number of "punitive damages" cases as a percentage of the "court"
cases (I assumed the word "court" appeared in every case). For the five year period
1981-1985 the figure was 6.5%; for the period 1986-1990 it was 6.1%, representing a
slight decline from the earlier five-year period. The absolute number of cases had
increased by about 50%. A noticeable increase in the percentage of punitive damages
claims occurred from 1960 to 1985, with a leveling off since then. Applying the same
search words to one-year time periods, I obtained the following figures:
1950 1.0% 1970 2.4% 1990 6.2%
1955 1.2% 1975 3.8%
1960 1.2% 1980 5.3%
1965 1.7% 1985 7.2%
For federal Court of Appeals cases the percentage increase was smaller:
1950 .7% 1975 2.4%
1955 .7% 1980 2.2%
1960 .9% 1985 3.1%
1965 .7% 1990 1.9%
1970 1.1%
195 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
196 "We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply because we doubt its
wisdom .... ." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
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due process clause, in particular, the line between the two is at some points
obliterated because "reasonableness" and "fairness" are elements of both
wisdom and due process. This creates a very real temptation for courts to
read their own policy preferences into the due process requirement that a law
be reasonable and fair. For this reason, if no other, a court should hesitate
to overturn long-established law on due process grounds without
overwhelming evidence that the law is indeed unreasonable and unfair.
This Article has argued that such overwhelming evidence is not to be
found. On the contrary, the present system satisfies due process. Substantive
due process, as applied to economic matters, requires only that the law in
question not be arbitrary or irrational. A system that imposes liability upon
a factual finding of outrageous conduct, and admonishes the jury to consider
all the facts and circumstances in determining the amount necessary for
punishment and deterrence, is not on its face arbitrary or irrational. Under
such a standard substantive due process plausibly could be invoked to void
excessive punitive damages awards in individual cases, but this adds little if
anything to existing common law powers of courts to overturn jury awards
that are excessive or a result of bias and prejudice. Much would be changed
if substantive due process were held to require a fixed limitation or ceiling
on punitive damages generally, but such an interpretation of the standard
would be inherently contradictory. Due process condemns the arbitrary and
unreasonable, and any generalized limit-whether a fixed dollar limitation or
some ratio or multiple of compensatory damages-is bound to be arbitrary
precisely because it ignores the facts of individual cases. A cap fixed at a
level high enough to satisfy in every case the demands of punishment,
deterrence, and example would be too high to provide a meaningfil
limitation in most cases (and might even encourage higher awards). A cap
fixed at a low level, on the other hand, would arbitrarily preclude larger
awards even when needed to meet the demands of punishment or deterrence.
A legislature, faced with the difficult policy choice, might constitutionally set
a limit at one level or another. But surely due process should not require the
fixing of a limit that must necessarily be arbitrary in some of its applications,
or else so broad as to be meaningless.
With respect to procedural guarantees, the Supreme Court has
previously decided, for good reason, that a punitive damages action involving
only private parties does not entitle the defendant to claim the benefit of the
Constitution's criminal safeguards, even if one purpose of the award is
punishment. 1" Nor does a punitive damages action embrace any other
element (such as potential loss of liberty, or other fundamental rights) that
"7 Kelco v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 490 U.S. 454 (1989).
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has in the past led the Court to grant special procedural protection to one
party or the other."' Application of the relevant portions of the due process
test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge"9 leads to no different conclusion.
The defendant's interest is primarily monetary-not an interest that calls for
heightened procedural safeguards. As for the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of property, the safeguards of an adversary proceeding conducted in
accordance with the rules of civil procedure do not seem prima facie
inadequate. Alternative procedures undoubtedly could be used to reduce the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of defendant's property; indeed, punitive
damages could be abolished and the risk would be reduced to zero. But that
is not the point of Mathews or of due process. In a civil contest between two
private parties, the aim of due process is to reduce the probability of an
erroneous outcome. Any procedural change in the defendant's favor would
increase the probability of erroneously defeating the plaintiff's claim. A
legislature, for policy reasons, might wish to do this, or even to abolish the
remedy of punitive damages. But due process does not require it.
The allegation of "unbridled" jury discretion, at first glance, is the
most plausible of the due process arguments. Juries are usually instructed in
terms that provide little specific guidance regarding either liability or the
amount of the award.' However, broad jury discretion is not without
precedent in the law. Large bodies of tort law rely heavily on such subjective
concepts as gross negligence, malice, or wanton and willful behavior-the
same concepts used in jury instructions for determining punitive damages
liability. Moreover, the jury is typically left to its "sound discretion" in
deciding what amount is appropriate to punish and deter and this is no
broader than the typical instruction to juries charged with awarding
compensatory damages for pain and suffering. Thus, if jury instructions in
a punitive damages case are too imprecise to satisfy due process, other
significant bodies of tort law are also called into question. This should at
least give pause to a court contemplating the constitutionalization of punitive
damages.
If the court pauses long enough, it may recognize that leaving such
decisions to the sound discretion of the jury, subject to judicial oversight, is
neither arbitrary nor irrational. Given the subjective nature of the things the
jury is asked to assess-culpability, desert, deterrence-detailed instructions
are likely to provide, at best, a spurious precision. The New Jersey statute
cited earlier in this Article identifies a number of relevant factors for the jury
198 See supra text accompanying notes 109-16.
199 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 85-123.
200 See supra notes 133-35, 137-45 and accompanying text.
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to consider, such as the profitability of the misconduct, its duration, the
defendant's mental state, any mitigating conduct, and the defendant's wealth.
These could give some guidance to a jury, but would not necessarily be more
limiting because they still leave a dominant role for subjective judgment and,
in any event, the jury is free to consider other factors as well. The one
effective way to limit the amount of the award is to establish specific ceilings
or ranges within which the verdict must fall. At that point, however, the
limitation becomes one of substantive law rather than procedure, raising
again the paradox of setting arbitrary limits in the name of a constitutional
rule intended to prevent arbitrary conduct.
The law of punitive damages may (or may not) stand in need of
substantial reform. If reform is needed, constitutionalizing the law is a
clumsy, inappropriate way to achieve it. The due process clause undoubtedly
could be used as an instrument of reform because its contours are so vague
and its substance so amorphous. For that very reason, however, the Court
should hesitate to read new meaning into it unless fundamental rights can be
protected in no other way. Otherwise due process becomes a cover for
judicial legislation, a function not wholly eschewed by the Court in the past
but one not conferred by the Constitution. A punitive damages claim involves
no right more fundamental than money, and it is peculiarly amenable to
legislative reform. Many legislatures have already given consideration to the
matter. Without a clear mandate from the Constitution, the Court should
leave reform of punitive damages law to the political process.
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